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Plagiarism: ‘the practice of 
taking someone else’s work or 
ideas and passing them off as 
one’s own.’1  
 
I. Introduction 
In this essay, I propose that Frege plagiarized the Stoics on a large scale in his work on the 
philosophy of logic and language as written mainly between 1890 and his death in 1925 
(much of which was only published posthumously), and possibly earlier. I use ‘plagiarize’ 
merely as a descriptive term. The essay is not concerned with finger pointing or casting moral 
judgement. This is left to those who feel so inclined. The point is rather to demonstrate that 
there are numerous and extensive parallels in both formulation and content between the 
Stoics and Frege, so plentiful that one would be hard pressed to brush them off as 
coincidence. These parallels include several that appear to occur in no other modern works 
that were published before Frege’s own and were accessible to him. Additionally, a cluster of 
corroborating historical data is adduced to support the suggestion.  
 Once it is understood that Frege draws from the Stoics, and where in his work and by 
which channels he does so, some elements of his philosophy of language can be given new 
readings in the light of his—unacknowledged—contemplation and absorption of Stoic logic. 
Conversely, the comparison with Frege’s philosophy makes it possible to shed new light on 
some issues in Stoic logic and philosophy of language. In this way, this piece also contributes 
on a small scale to the philosophical interpretation of Frege’s work and of Stoic philosophy, 
and, as such, is not merely of historical interest. (Such issues include the logical structure of 
commands and questions, emotional elements in assertion-like contents, the treatment of 
what Frege calls mock thoughts, the logical status of indexicals, the reduction of causal 
statements, language regimentation, including Frege’s ‘Hilfssprache’, and more.) In addition, 
I seek to provide a wider philosophical audience with the groundbreaking, original, but 
 
1 The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (Knowles 2006).  




widely neglected philosophical and logical work of the Stoics. I thus simultaneously offer an 
introduction to Stoic philosophy of logic and language. For those acquainted with Stoic 
philosophy but not Frege’s, on the other hand, I provide a glimpse into Frege’s work on logic 
and language. 
 No knowledge of Greek, Latin, or German is required of the reader. Some terms and 
phrases in these languages are given in brackets and footnotes as evidence, but they are 
inessential for the understanding of any major point. Greek expressions in the main text are 
transliterated. Translations are my own, except where noted otherwise. For the texts and 
editions used and cited in brackets by and of Frege, the Stoics and some others, sigla and 
abbreviations are introduced at their first occurrence. At the end of the paper, an alphabetical 
list of the sigla is added for ease of reference. It is in the nature of the project that there are 
copious comparisons. I hope to have succeeded in staying away from the terribly tedious by 
leading the reader through a number of philosophically fascinating issues that are still of 
contemporary relevance and providing a fresh perspective on various philosophical questions.  
 
 
II. Historical background 
I begin, however, with a light-hearted look at the historical background and at how this paper 
took shape. When I wrote my 2006 Stanford Encyclopaedia entry on ancient logic, I had just 
co-taught a graduate class on Frege’s philosophy of logic and language, and noticed so many 
parallels to the Stoics that I recklessly included the sentence, ‘The many close similarities 
between [the Stoic] Chrysippus’ philosophical logic and that of Gottlob Frege are especially 
striking’, planning to follow this lead at a later point. But I got side-tracked. Still, it seems, 
my sentence did not go unnoticed. In 2009, a German article appeared in which three German 
professors—a classicist and two historians of philosophy—contend that Frege had been 
influenced in his work by his knowledge of Stoic logic. These three men pooled their 
resources and embarked on some detective work that led them to fascinating revelations: 
revelations of a kind that had never crossed my mind.2 Their article culminates with two 
photographic images. The first is a photo of the 350th anniversary celebration at the 
University of Jena in 1908 (from the Universitätsarchiv Jena). 
 
 
2 Gabriel, Hülser, and Schlotter 2009. A useful little summary is available in English in The Bulletin 
of Symbolic Logic (Wille 2010). 










You see here on the right the famous logician Gottlob Frege and on the left the famous 
classicist Rudolf Hirzel—although, as the authors hasten to mention, with an aisle between 
them. ‘So what?’ you may say, ‘I have sat next to a famous classicist, and still do not know 
much about Stoic logic’. But there is more in the German article. Hirzel is not just any 
famous classicist. He was a specialist on various aspects of Stoic philosophy who published, 




in 1879, an article entitled De logica Stoicorum (‘On the logic of the Stoics’). And there is 
even more: For twenty-four years (1889 to 1913), Hirzel lived in Frege’s house, renting the 
upper floor. And they shared an acquaintance, the philologically trained philosopher Rudolf 
Christoph Eucken, Professor at Jena from 1874–1920, who, believe it or not, lived across the 
street from Frege. Moreover, both Hirzel and Frege were introverts. Therefore, the three 
German professors conclude, Hirzel and Frege must have talked to each other. And I agree 
that even two introverts, if they live floor to ceiling for twenty-four years, are likely to have 
exchanged a word or two. (‘The tap is leaking.’ ‘Oh. I’ll see to it.’) Not so clear is how the 
three German professors imagine that elements of Stoic philosophy entered Frege’s mind via 
Hirzel. No decisive evidence, in the form of, say, letters or diary entries, has yet surfaced, so 
we have here an open question.  
 The discursive ARGUMENT OF THE THREE PROFESSORS is in large part based on 
conjecture and it is not entirely compelling. Here is a brief summary of their reasoning, with 
my assessment in brackets. Details will be provided elsewhere. 
 
(i) Frege knew the classicist Hirzel. (This is correct.)  
(a) They talked to each other. (This is almost certainly correct.)  
(b) Frege got a sentence from Plato’s Hippias Major from Hirzel. (This is possible, if 
irrelevant.)  
(ii) Frege was impacted by Stoic logic. (This is correct.) 
(iii) The points of impact happened after 1889. (This is possible.) 
(iv) The points of impact that happened after 1889 are the following:  
(a) Stoic lekta led to Frege’s ‘Gedanken’ (this is incorrect as it stands);  
(b) The Stoic notion of predicate impacted Frege’s notion of predicates as function 
(this is likely incorrect).  
 (v) Frege learned about the elements of Stoic logic mentioned in (iv) from the ‘middleman’ 
Hirzel. (There is no evidence.)  
(vi) Hirzel was qualified in matters of Stoic logic. (This is incorrect. Hirzel was somewhat 
qualified in matters of Stoic epistemology, which the Stoics classified as logikē, yes. For 
qualifications in Stoic logic proper, or dialektikē, there is no evidence. His De logica 
Stoicorum is not about logic in the sense in which Frege would have understood the word.)  




(vii) Frege learnt about the Stoics from Hirzel in a busy discussion circle which also included 
Eucken. (There is no evidence of such a discussion circle.)3 
 
The authors produce no evidence that Hirzel ever talked to Frege about Stoic logic, or that he 
talked to him at all about philosophical issues, beyond perhaps alerting him to a passage in 
Plato’s Hippias Major. Unless and until written evidence is unearthed that confirms 
conversations between Frege and Hirzel about Stoic logic, in Frege’s understanding of the 
word, I take it as unproven that Hirzel was a ‘qualified middle man’ (‘qualifizierter 
Mittelsmann’)4 between the Stoics and Frege.  
 
 THE ALTERNATIVE I SUGGEST contends that Stoic logic had a much wider-ranging 
impact on Frege. Imagine Frege had a choice between conversing with an introverted 
classicist who had, as far as we know, no understanding of logic in the sense in which Frege 
takes it (‘logic proper’), and conversing with a group of brilliant logicians, logicians who 
could not talk back, at that. My guess is that he would have preferred the logicians. The 
assumption that Frege conversed with the Stoics (more) directly is, I suggest, a more 
promising assumption than that he conversed with them via discussion with Hirzel. In other 
words, if Stoic logic had an impact on Frege’s logic, then this impact would have come 
primarily from books containing Stoic logic that Frege himself read—in his study, as is apt 
for an introvert.  
 Here is my hypothesis: Frege helped himself generously to elements of Stoic logic as 
they were presented in the first volume of Carl Prantl’s monumental four-volume Geschichte 
der Logik im Abendland (History of Western Logic), published in 1855.5 This volume 
contains a very long chapter on Stoic logic proper (401–96). More than half of the chapter 
consists of tightly printed footnotes that present a major part of the—then known—extant 
Stoic testimony on logic in the original Greek and Latin sources. The main text offers a 
relentlessly deprecating summary-cum-paraphrase of Stoic logic, based on the texts quoted in 
the footnotes. These ninety-five pages remained for almost a century and a half the best 
comprehensive source for Stoic logic in any language (and the only one in a work on the 
history of logic), despite the fact that Prantl tells us on every other page how idiotic 
 
3 Dathe 1995 suggests repeatedly that Frege and Eucken must have had philosophical conversations. 
He does not adduce any piece of evidence for this hypothesis.  
4 Gabriel, Hülser, and Schlotter 2009: 383. 
5 Geschichte der Logik im Abendland (München 1855–70, 4 vols, vol. I, published in 1855).  




(‘blödsinnig’) and piffling (‘läppisch’) the Stoic theory was. Some details will establish the 
historical plausibility of this assumption.  
 Hirzel’s intercession would not have been required for Frege to learn about the 
existence and importance of Prantl’s work. It was generally well known.6 Sigwart for 
example, in his preface (p. VI) to the first edition of the 1873 first volume of his widely 
known Logik, acknowledges ‘Prantl’s terrific work’ (‘grossartiges Werk’) in a breath with 
Trendelenburg, Ueberweg, and Mill, and no others, fifteen years before Hirzel moved into 
Frege’s house. Sigwart also mentions Prantl at least five times in that volume. We know that 
at some point Frege took notes or excerpts from that very work.7 One also needs to remember 
that the number of German books on logic to appear per year was relatively small, and that 
Frege seems to have read widely on logic—he even read Wilhelm Wundt’s Logik.8 Note 
further that Frege’s colleague Eucken draws attention to Prantl’s work in his lectures on logic 
in Jena in 1880-2 (Kreiser 2001: 290).  
 Frege would have had easy access to Prantl’s work. Besides a bookstore and the Jena 
University Library, there would have been Hirzel’s library as a possible source. Not only was 
Hirzel’s father, Solomon Hirzel, the publisher of the work, but Hirzel himself refers to 
Prantl’s section on the Stoics in his 1879 paper, and there are at least nine references to 
Prantl’s first volume in his 1882 Cicero tome. So we can assume Hirzel read parts of it and 
most probably owned a copy.9 Presumably, Hirzel would have understood very little of 
Prantl, who, although he loathed the Stoics, had at least the good sense to represent their 
views in many parts correctly, before labelling them inane.  
 Frege, on the other hand, was in the best possible position of perhaps all German 
philosophers and logicians at the time to comprehend and appreciate the extraordinary 
treasure trove Prantl lays bare. First, Frege knew and could read both Greek and Latin. 
Kreiser 2001: 38-43, especially the figure on p.42, suggest that at school Frege had ten years 
of intensive Latin courses and eight years of intensive Greek courses. Generally, this would 
have been part of the education at a German ‘Gymnasium’ in the mid-nineteenth century and 
 
6 See e.g. Zeller 1856–68, as noted by Gabriel, Hülser, and Schlotter 2009: 381; Trendelenburg 1862: 
(I) 33, 311; Ueberweg 1871: 19. 
7 Cf. Scholz’s catalogue of Frege’s ‘Nachlass’ as published at the end of Veraart 1976. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Despite the title, in his 1879 paper Hirzel is not concerned with any questions of logic, but with the 
question of whether it was the Stoics who introduced the word ‘logic’ (logikē) for a philosophical 
discipline—an application with a vastly wider range than that of the ‘logic’ that Frege was interested 
in, which would correspond more closely to what the Stoic called dialectic (dialektikē). In his 1882 
volume, he also does not cite Prantl in any context of logic proper. 




the norm for any professor in the humanities. For ancient Greek, compare for example 
Sigwart’s above-mentioned Logik, which amply quotes Greek in footnotes without 
translation. For Latin, consider that publications in Latin were not unusual in the mid-
nineteenth century. (Recall that Hirzel’s De logica Stoicorum is written in Latin.) Frege’s 
own writings show frequent sprinkles of Latin, many examples of and allusions to Classics, 
as well as a verse from Homer quoted in Greek, just so, as an example of onomatopoeia, and 
casual reference to the Greek spiritus lenis.10 Frege’s work also shows that he was acquainted 
with many aspects of Aristotelian logic.11 Second, as those versed in Stoic logic know, it was 
in the first instance a propositional logic, a kind of logic barely understood by anyone in the 
nineteenth century before Frege’s Begriffsschrift.  
 So it would be astounding if Frege (i) had not known of Prantl’s work, (ii) had not had 
access to it, and (iii) did not have what it takes to understand Prantl’s long chapter on Stoic 
logic with its many primary sources. Moreover (iv), even a cursory reading of parts of that 
chapter would have been bound to pique his interest.12 Any perusing of that chapter would 
also have directed Frege to book 7 of Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum (Lives of the 
Philosophers, composed c. the second century CE), which, in forty paragraphs (D.L. 7.43–
83), contains perhaps our most valuable continuous source of Stoic logic, a detailed, 
historically reliable, summary of all its main aspects, hereafter referred to as the Summary. 
Much of it is found in Prantl’s footnotes, but one should not rule out the possibility that Frege 
had independent knowledge of this work. At the time, it was well-known and widely 
available, including in two German translations.13  
 
10 Latin: See SB, CP 164 for a Latin quote from Leibniz; and the footnote OCN, PW 79: ‘“Omnia una 
sunt”, a Latinist would say, if not deterred by his feeling for the language […]’. BLC, PW 9–10 
strongly suggest Frege read Leibniz in Latin, with several lines quoted in Latin, plus three work titles. 
He uses classical Latin examples as well: Cicero, Cato, etc. Greek: Frege quotes Greek expressions in 
Greek letters: PWLB, PW 139 he writes: ‘man vergleiche dazu den homerischen Vers (Odyss. IX,71): 
τριχθά τε καὶ τετραχθὰ διέσχισεν ἲς ἀνέμοιο’. He quotes the entire verse in Greek and seems to 
assume that the reader, too, knows Homer in Greek. Cf. also the Greek πρῶτον ψεῦδος in DPE, PW 
62, 64. There are references to Homer in e.g. SB (Odysseus), and in PWLB, PW 129 (‘Scylla has six 
heads’). Further, we find in GG IX 45 a casual reference to the ancient Greek accent spiritus lenis: 
‘the smooth breathing, designating the value-range of a function, and a sign to play the role of the 
definite article in language’ (‘der Spiritus lenis zur Bezeichnung des Werthverlaufs einer Function 
und ein Zeichen, das den bestimmten Artikel der Sprache vertreten soll’, GG IX 9). 
11 E.g. in BS.  
12 Even without further textual evidence, we can assume that Frege would have had an interest in 
Prantl’s work. Philosophy was far more interwoven with its history than it is in Anglo-Saxon 
analytical philosophy nowadays. 
13 Snell and Snell 1806 and Borheck 1807. 




 In brief, my hypothesis then is this: Frege learned about Stoic logic from Prantl’s 
History of Western Logic, which he may or may not have borrowed from Hirzel, but is likely 
to have known (of) before the Hirzels became his lodgers. Additionally, Frege may have read 
the Summary on Stoic logic in Diogenes Laertius, possibly in one of its widely available 
German translations. At this point, I deliberately leave several questions open. Why am I so 
certain that Frege drew on Prantl, rather than primary texts or some other source? How, more 
specifically, did the content of Prantl’s chapter on Stoic logic become incorporated into 
Frege’s work? Was it intentional? Would it really be plagiarism? Naturally, these questions 




III. Textual evidence 
The text-based argument in section III is strictly accumulative. No single textual parallel 
validates the thesis of plagiarism. It is by accruing passage by passage, sentence by sentence, 
phrase by phrase, the Stoic elements in Frege’s oeuvre, organizing them by (Stoic) topic, and 
considering their philosophical significance (and adding to this the historical data provided 
above) that a compelling case is built.14 Taking in the result requires patience on the part of 
the reader. Those who are less interested in the philosophical implications of the parallels can 
directly consult the tables with synopses added for each topic in order to facilitate absorption 
of the semblances at a glance.  
 In view of the various historical data given above, the investigation is almost entirely 
restricted to Stoic passages and Stoic doctrine on logic and language as found in Prantl and in 
the Summary. Here I add three further reasons, based on the assumption—to be corroborated 
below—that Frege had knowledge of Stoic logic. First, it is vastly more likely that Frege 
obtained his knowledge of Stoic logic from one text, rather than from browsing through the 
dozens of Greek and Latin works with testimonies on Stoic logic that Prantl brings together. 
(Of the hundreds of Stoic logical works, not one has survived in its entirety and we are almost 
completely dependent on later ancient sources.) Second, virtually all parallels between Stoics 
 
14 In the end, in order to get the full picture the reader would have to read Prantl, including the Greek 
and Latin footnotes, followed by all of Frege’s later philosophical (as opposed to mathematical and 
purely logical) works. What becomes apparent when doing so is that—other than epistemic 
arguments, comments, and observations on psychological matters, remarks on post-medieval logic, 
contrasts with Aristotle, and academic disputes with contemporaries—there is very little in Frege that 
does not have an analogue of some sort in the Stoics as reported by Prantl.  




and Frege are present in Prantl, and some important elements of Stoic logic without parallels 
in Frege are missing in Prantl. The main examples are: the important fragmentary papyrus of 
Chrysippus’ Logical Investigations (PHerc 307), which was first published in 1873; the long 
passage in Alexander’s Prior Analytics commentary on negation (An. Pr. 402–05), and a 
number of further passages in the Aristotle commentators, in some grammarians, and in 
scholia. Third, there are several misunderstandings or distortions of Stoic logic in Prantl 




The following agreement between Frege and the Stoics lies at the very bottom of the many 
similarities: that the contents of our thinking and communicating are imperceptible, 
incorporeal entities that we can all share, and which we express in language. The Stoic term 
for their contents was lekta, customarily translated as ‘sayables’ (what can be said), but also 
allowing the translation ‘thinkables’ (what can be thought). Most of what Frege considered 
content, he called ‘sense’ (‘Sinn’). I disregard all metaphysical issues concerning these 
contents, beyond mentioning the following well-known facts: both the Stoics and Frege 
distinguished between (i) the things in the external world, (ii) our presentations or 
impressions based on these things, (iii) linguistic expressions, including sentences, as a 
special subclass of the things in the external world, (iv) the incorporeal content, including 
assertoric content, and (v) our mentally entertaining such content.16 For both, content is most 
closely connected with linguistic expressions: with the linguistic expressions we say or 
 
15 It is my view that in the later works by Frege, in particular the latest publications and the 
unpublished work on logic and language, we often find in different texts slightly different views on 
individual issues, presumably due to Frege trying out various ways of developing and expressing his 
theory. It seems wrong to me to try to provide in all such cases complex and contorted textual 
interpretations for no reason but to show that all things Frege wrote in his later years are mutually 
consistent.  
16 STOICS: (i) tugchanonta, (ii) phantasiai, (iii) logoi, ekphorai, (iv) ta sēmainonta, lekta, with 
axiōmata as subclass, (v) logikai phantasiai (cf. D.L. 7.56, 57, 67; S.E. M. 8.11, 12, 70; Epist. 117.13; 
Prantl 415–21) FREGE: (i) ‘Dinge in der Aussenwelt’ (T69), (ii) ‘Vorstellungen’ (Thoughts, passim), 
(iii) ‘Sätze’, ‘sprachliche Ausdrücke’ (T60), (iv) ‘Sinn’, with ‘Gedanken’ as subclass (SB, Thoughts, 
Logik), (v) ‘Denken’, ‘Fassen der Gedanken’ (T74–75). Historians of logic have remarked on these 
parallels (Mates 1961: 19–26, esp. 20, if not entirely accurately; Bochenski 1956: 127; Gabriel, 
Hülser, and Schlotter 2009: 375–77). A close comparison of Prantl 1855: 416–17 with Frege’s 
Gedanke or Logik may be interesting, but is not my topic here. 




express the content.17 In what follows, I concentrate on how either party treats the 
fundamental philosophical issue of how meaning or content is related to linguistic 
expressions. The Stoics and Frege each distinguish many different kinds of contents. As a 
rough structuring guide, I follow the detailed Stoic classification of contents as it is found in 
Diogenes Laertius’ report of Stoic logic and which is largely followed by Prantl. 
 
 
III.1.1. Incomplete content 
For both Frege and the Stoics, a fundamental distinction is that between complete contents 
and incomplete contents.18 Incomplete contents require completion. It appears that 
incomplete contents are not contents in the true sense: ‘incomplete’ produces a contradictio 
in adjecto. 
FREGE says about (simple or basic) thoughts that, ‘The sentence expressing such a 
thought is composed of a proper name […] and a predicative part, which corresponds to the 
unsaturated part of the thought’ (Introduction to Logic (IL) PW 187).19 By contrast, a 
‘thought […] needs no completion’ (CT37, CP 391).20 
The STOICS call the incomplete contents ellipē (incomplete, lacking). The Greek ellipē 
and—to a lesser degree—Prantl’s German translation (‘mangelhaft’ = ‘deficient’) match 
Frege’s terms for incompleteness (‘unvollständig’, ‘ergänzungsbedürftig’). The Stoics, too, 
consider one-place-predicates as the paradigm case of incomplete content—‘predicates are 
classified as incomplete lekta’ (D.L. 7.63)—and they define their most common simple 
assertibles (katēgorikon axiōma) as ‘composed from a ptōsis [roughly, the content of a proper 
name or noun] and a predicate’. The incomplete contents are said to have an unfinished 
 
17 Cf. Frege, Logik NS 142–43, PW 131, ‘Das eigentliche Ausdrucksmittel für den Gedanken ist der 
Satz’; T61, ‘der Satz drücke einen Gedanken aus’. STOICS: D.L. 7.57, λόγος ἀεί σημαντικός (a 
linguistic expressions always signifies), προφέρονται αἱ φωναί λέγεται δέ τά πράγματα, ἁ δή καὶ 
λεκτά τυγχάνει (what is said are the things, which are also called sayables (lekta)); see also the rest of 
section III.  
18 This similarity is pointed out by Kneale and Kneale 1962: 500 and repeated by Gabriel, Hülser, and 
Schlotter 2009: 384–85. 
19 ‘Der Satz, der einen solchen Gedanken ausdrückt, besteht aus einem Eigennamen […] und einem 
prädikativen Teile, der dem ungesättigten Teile des Gedankens entspricht’ (‘Einleitung in die Logik’ 
[Einleitung] NS 203). Cf. NS 129 Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung: ungesättigt, 
ergänzungsbedürftig; prädikativer Teil eines Gedankens, Einleitung in die Logik (EidL), NS 203, PW 
187; in Begriff und Funktion (FC 6, CP 140): ‘eine Funktion “unvollständig, ergänzungsbedürftig 
oder ungesättigt zu nennen”’. In Concept and Object—CO 197, CP 187, n. 11: unsaturated; CO 205, 
CP 193: doubly unsaturated. 
20 ‘Gedanke […] bedarf […] keiner Ergänzung’ (CT37, LU 73). 




(anapartiston) expression (ekphora). The Stoic example is ‘writes’, expression of which (on 
its own) is said to elicit the question ‘who?’ (D.L. 7.63, Prantl 438–39, n. 111). (We see later 
that this points to a difference in understanding between Frege and the Stoics of the kind of 
incompleteness.)21 
 
INCOMPLETE CONTENTS  
STOIC incomplete (ellipē) (D.L. 7.43, S.E. M. 
8.70, Prantl 418, n. 55). 
FREGEAN unsaturated (‘ungesättigt’) (EidL, 
NS 203, PW 192), incomplete 
(‘unvollständig’) (FC 6, CP 140). 
Requires completion (D.L. 7.63, Prantl 439). Requires supplementation (e.g. CT37, CP 
390, implied). 
Unary predicate (katēgorēma) as main 
example of incomplete content (D.L. 7.63, 
Prantl 439). 
Unary predicate as main example of 
incomplete content (EidL, NS 203, PW 187). 
Predicate as function (suggested by D.L. 
7.69–70, see Bobzien and Shogry, 
forthcoming; Gabriel, Hülser, and Schlotter 
2009). 
Predicate as function (Begr 15–19). 
Doubly unsaturated or binary predicates (see 
Bobzien and Shogry, forthcoming). 
Doubly unsaturated or binary predicates 
(EidL, NS 209, CO, CP 193). 
 
My focus in section III will be almost entirely on complete or saturated contents, and it is 
with these that I start.  
 
 
III.1.2. Complete contents  
The first noteworthy similarity with regard to complete contents is that both Frege and the 
Stoics maintain that there are multiple kinds of complete contents that are on a par. For 
Frege, not every sentence that has a sense is a thought (T61, CP 61). A thought is at the same 
level as commands, requests, etc. (SB38, CP 167, ‘auf derselben Stufe’, my italics). Prantl 
writes about the Stoics that they ‘[…] distinguish besides the proper axiōma a number of 
sentences as co-ordinated kinds, namely […]’ (Prantl 441, my italics).22 This co-ordination is 
 
21 Gabriel, Hülser, and Schlotter 2009 claim (384–85) that Frege’s notions of unsaturatedness and the 
incompleteness of predicates (as opposed to Frege’s understanding of predicates as functions in Begr) 
goes back to Stoic logic, and that (378) Chrysippus considered some predicates ‘almost as Fregean 
functions’. 
22 ‘indem [die Stoiker] von dem eigentlichen axiōma […] noch eine Mehrzahl von Sätzen als 
coordinierte Arten unterscheiden, nemlich […]’. The Aristotelian Prantl does not distinguish between 
complete lekta and the sentences that express these. 




confirmed both by the relevant Summary passages (D.L. 7.63, 65–68, Prantl 441, n. 115) and 
by the other two sources for Stoic complete contents that Prantl quotes, i.e. a list of accounts 
in Sextus and a comparison with Aristotle in Ammonius (S.E. M. 8.70–73; Ammon. Int. 2.9–
6.3, FDS 897; Prantl 441 ns 115, 117).  
Such a coordination of different complete contents is remarkable, since the customary 
view is—and was at Frege’s time—that there is one kind of complete content, something like 
a common propositional content, that can be combined with all different kinds of force, or 
that is part of all different kinds of speech acts.23 A multiplication of complete contents is 
generally considered to be an unnecessary multiplication of entities, and both Frege and the 
Stoics have been admonished for their lavish ontology.24 
 In several of his works, FREGE mentions a plurality of complete contents, leaving their 
exact number unspecified. He itemizes explicitly Thoughts (‘Gedanken’), two kinds of 
questions, commands, wishes (via ‘Wunschsätze’), requests, apparent thoughts, and some 
that are more-than-thoughts.25 To all the specified complete contents that we find in Frege, 
the STOICS have corresponding kinds, and, additionally, a few more (see D.L. 7.65–68; S.E. 
M. 8.70–74; Ammon. Int. 2.9–6.3, FDS 897; Prantl 442–43, with the mentioned texts in 
 
23 E.g. for Bolzano 1837: (I) 88, propositions (‘Sätze an sich’) include commands. (The issue of 
whether command sentences, interrogative sentences, etc. have truth-values had been mentioned in a 
number of logic texts between Aristotle’s time and that of Frege. The issue here concerns complete 
contents, not sentences.) 
24 Cf. for example, Dummett, 1981a: 307: ‘In “Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung” [Frege] […] regards the 
difference between assertoric, interrogative, imperative and optative sentences as a difference in their 
sense rather than in the force attaching to them. Thus he says that, just as assertoric sentences express 
thoughts, so interrogatives express questions, imperatives commands, and optatives wishes (SB38–39, 
FBB 53–54). This view we may regard as definitely wrong […]’; FPL 308: ‘Frege makes a certain 
modification of this view in his “Der Gedanke” […]. There he still thinks that an imperative expresses 
a command, considered as something parallel to a thought; but he now thinks that a sentential 
interrogative expresses the same thought as the corresponding assertoric sentence, and differs from it 
only in the force attached to it (T62, CP 355; N143–44, CP 373–74). This parallel is thus in itself 
significant’. There are parallels to both these views in Prantl and his Stoic sources (see below). 
Bronowski 2019: 394–97 argues that all Stoic complete contents contain an axiōma. This does not sit 
well with their definition of command contents and their acceptance of addresses as complete 
contents. It may well be true that some kinds of Stoic command contents in some sense contain 
complete contents. 
25 SB38–39: ‘Command, request […] stand on the same level as thoughts; […] the case is similar for 
[…] questions. (‘Befehl, Bitte: stehen […] mit Gedanken auf derselben Stufe; ähnlich Frage’); T62: 
command [sentences] (‘Befehlssätze’), wish-expressing sentences (‘Wunschsätze’) and request-
expressing sentences (‘Bittsätze’) have sense (‘Sinn’); N145–46: the sense of an interrogative 
sentence (‘Sinn eines Fragesatzes’) is a thought (‘Gedanke’); Logik NS 140 = PWLB PW129: 
‘sentences expressing wishes, questions, requests, and commands […] assertoric sentences’ 
(‘Wunsch-, Frage-, Aufforderungs-, Befehlssätze […] Behauptungssätze’), ‘truth is only ascribed to 
the sense (‘Sinn’) of assertoric sentences’. 




footnotes 115–117). We do not know their exact number. In the following, I compare each of 
the individual kinds of complete contents that Frege mentions with their Stoic counterparts.  
Here we have one of the reasons why Prantl (rather than Hirzel or individual Stoic 
texts) is more likely to be Frege’s source: Prantl considers the Stoic quasi-axiōmata and the 
Stoic more-than-axiōmata to be two different kinds of complete content (Prantl 442–43: 
homoion axiōma 442, pleonazein 443), although closer reading of the texts (D.L. 7.65–68; 
S.E. M. 8.70–74; Ammon. Int. 2.9–6.3) makes it clear that they were the same Stoic kind of 
complete content.  
 
COMPLETE CONTENTS  
STOIC complete assertible (autoteles axiōma, 
D.L. 7.73; ‘vollständig’, Prantl 438, 440). 
FREGEAN saturated, complete (‘gesättigt’, 
‘vollständig’). 
——– as co-ordinated kinds (‘co-ordinirte 
Arten’, Prantl 441). 
——– at the same level (SB38–39, CP 167). 
——– include primarily axiōmata/assertibles, 
sentence questions, word questions, 
commands, wishes or requests (euktikon), 
quasi-axiōmata, more-than-axiōmata, and a 
few others (Prantl 441–43). 
——– include thoughts (‘Gedanken’), 
sentence questions, word questions, 
commands, wishes (via a ‘Wunschsätze’), 
requests (‘Bitten’), apparent thoughts, and 
some that are more-than-thoughts (SB38–39, 
CP 38–39; T61–62, CP 355; N145–46, CP 
375; Logik, NS 140–41 = PWLB PW 129, 
not a good translation). 
Assertibles are contrasted with other non-
assertible complete sayables in order to bring 
out the nature of the assertibles (in particular 
their being true or false) (D.L. 7.66, 68; cf. 
S.E. M. 8.70–74; Prantl 442–43). 
‘In order to bring out more precisely what I 
mean by “a thought” I shall distinguish 
various kinds of sentences’ (‘Um das, was 
ich einen Gedanken nennen will, schärfer 
herauszuarbeiten, unterscheide ich Arten von 
Sätzen’) (T62). 
 
III.1.2.1. Assertoric content: Stoic assertibles and Fregean thoughts 
One of Frege’s main logical achievements is the distinction between expressing and asserting 
a thought. The Stoic contents that are closest to Frege’s thoughts (‘Gedanken’) are their 
assertibles (axiōmata). As a generic term for both I use ‘assertoric content’. Both Stoics and 
Frege have as their primary interest their assertoric complete contents.26 Both the Stoics and 
Frege struggle somewhat with explaining exactly what assertoric contents are.  
 
26 Frege in (T62, CP 355), see above. The vast majority of Chrysippus’ logical works are about 
assertibles of one kind or another (D.L. 7.190–98, Prantl 405–08). In the Summary, three sections are 
about non-assertoric complete contents (D.L. 7.66–68), fifteen about assertoric complete contents (65, 




 STOIC ASSERTIBLES are listed as being on a par with the other Stoic complete contents 
(Prantl 441; D.L. 7.66–68; S.E. M. 8.70–74). For all complete contents, the Stoics held that 
we do three different things simultaneously when we perform the corresponding speech act. 
First, we utter (propherein) or express/articulate (ekpherein) a meaningful or ‘content-ful’ 
sound, the sentence or complete phrase (logos) (D.L. 7.59; cf. S.E. PH 1.73; Prantl 415, n. 46; 
416, n. 47). This is a physical entity. Second, we say the incorporeal content (legein, D.L. 
7.59). Third, we assert, or command, or ask, etc., the content—depending on what sort of 
content it is (D.L. 7.66, 67, 68; Prantl 441, n. 115). So, in the case of the Stoic assertibles, we 
utter or formulate an assertoric sentence (apophantikos logos, axiōmatikē ekphora, D.L. 7.67, 
Prantl n. 115);27 we say the assertible, that is, we express the assertoric content (D.L. 7.66, 
Prantl n. 115); and we assert the assertible, that is, we make an assertion (D.L. 7.66, Prantl n. 
115).28 We can then distinguish the following five distinct elements in the Stoic theory of 
assertibles: (i) the incorporeal assertible (axiōma); (ii) the assertoric sentence with which it is 
standardly expressed (logos apophantikē); (iii) the uttering (proferein) of the meaningful 
sound and the formulation (ekphora) of that sentence/speech; and concomitant with the 
utterance, (iv) the saying (legein) of the assertible; and (v) the asserting (apophainometha) of 
the assertible.  
 The Stoics offered two accounts of ‘assertible’. First, an assertible is defined as a 
complete content that can be asserted in itself (D.L. 7.65; Gell. 16.8.4; Prantl 438, 
‘vollständig’ for ‘complete’).29 Second, assertibles are said to be that which is either true or 
false (D.L. 7.65; Prantl 441, 442), i.e. that which satisfies bivalence (and the semantic tertium 
non datur, assuming that the ‘or’ is exclusive).30 A variant of this second account reads that 
assertibles are the complete contents by saying which we say something true or something 
false (S.E. M. 8.73; Prantl 441). Either way, the bearers of truth-value are the incorporeal 
 
68–82). The Sextus passage also uses the non-assertoric complete contents as a foil for the assertoric 
ones (S.E. M. 8.70–74). 
27 This is the standard case. The Stoics did not claim that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between assertoric sentences and assertibles. See below. 
28 It appears that which one we do doing which (whether we assert by saying or say by asserting) is 
immaterial. The Summary has ‘saying the assertible we assert it’ (D.L. 7.66; similar S.E. M. 8.73); 
Sextus once has ‘asserting the assertible we say it’ (S.E. M. 8.71). 
29 The exact force of ‘in itself’ is debated (Frede 1974, Bobzien 1986), but this need not concern us 
here. Cf. also Borheck’s translation, ‘Ein Axiom aber ist […] eine an sich vollkommene Sache’ (‘the 
axiōma is a thing complete in itself’). 
30 Barnes 2007: 4–5 argues that this was not a definition of axiōma. D.L. 7.65 (Prantl 442, n. 116) 
presents it in the manner of a definition. For our present purposes, it suffices that it provides a 
necessary and sufficient condition for axiōmata. 




assertibles, not the assertoric sentences by which they are expressed (‘The True (to alēthes) 
lies in the lekton (context shows this is the assertible lekton) and is incorporeal’, Prantl 417, 
cf. 421; S.E. PH 2.81). Finally, the Stoics explain the choice of the Greek term for assertibles 
(axiōma) as originating from our acknowledgement of [the truth of] what we say: ‘Someone 
who says ‘it is day’ is believed to acknowledge [as true] that it is day, and when it is day, that 
assertible is true, if not, it is false’ (D.L. 7.65, axiousthai; Prantl 442, n. 116). So the fact that 
we give acknowledgement to an assertible when we say it is a feature that characterizes 
assertibles. The Stoics distinguish between having a logical presentation (logikē phantasia) of 
an axiōma (S.E. M. 8.70; Prantl 418, 419) and the giving of assent or assenting 
(sugkatathesis, D.L. 7.49, 51; Prantl 418, 419; Zeller 1852, 1883) to that presentation (of an 
axiōma) (D.L. 7.49). They also have the epistemic notion of the grasping (katalepsis, D.L. 
7.49, 52) of a reliably true (logical) presentation (kataleptikē phantasia), i.e. one that presents 
a true axiōma. 
 Compare all this with FREGE’S various attempts at defining and explaining what a 
thought (‘Gedanke’) is. He maintains that not every sentence that has a sense is a thought 
(T61, CP 354) and that a thought is at the same level as commands, request, etc. (SB38, CP 
167, ‘auf derselben Stufe’). Thoughts are expressed in assertoric sentences, and, as Frege puts 
it, ‘the imperceptible thought is dressed in the perceptible garb of the sentence’ (T61, CP 
354).31 It is the thought, not the sentence, that is the bearer of truth-value, or that which is 
either true or false (T60, 61, CP 353–54; CT37: ‘[…] ein Gedanke […], nämlich etwas von 
dem gilt: es ist entweder wahr oder falsch, ein Drittes gibt es nicht’; also 38, tertium non 
datur, EidL, NS 202). Frege writes ‘We express acknowledgement (‘Anerkennung’) of truth 
[of the thought] in the form of an assertoric sentence’ (T63, CP 356).32 He emphasizes that an 
assertoric sentence—when spoken sincerely33—contains (a) its content (‘Inhalt’), which is 
the thought (‘Gedanke’) and (b) the assertion (of the thought) (‘Behauptung’) (T62, CP 355). 
He explicates that it is with the saying of the assertoric sentence that we both convey 
(‘mitteilen’) or express (‘ausdrücken’) the thought and assert (‘behaupten’) (as true) the 
thought (T62, CP 355). Finally, in Negation, we read that the thought does not require a 
supplementation in order to obtain, but is complete in itself (‘in sich vollständig’, N155, CP 
 
31 ‘Der an sich unsinnliche Gedanke kleidet sich in das sinnliche Gewand des Satzes’ (T61, LU 33). 
32 ‘In der Form des Behauptungssatzes sprechen wir die Anerkennung der Wahrheit aus’ (T63, LU 
35). 
33 ‘An assertoric sentence contains both thought and assertion [only] when we speak sincerely’ (T62).  




386).34 Frege also makes the epistemological distinction between the ‘grasping of the 
thought’ (‘Fassen des Gedankens’) and the ‘acknowledgement of the truth’ (‘Anerkennung 
der Wahrheit eines Gedankens’) (T62, CP 356). This may correspond to the Stoic distinction 
between rational presentations (D.L. 7.49, 7.51, phantasiai logikai) and assenting 
(sugkatathesis, Prantl 419), or the acknowledgement mentioned in D.L. 7.65.35  
 
ASSERTORIC CONTENTS  
STOICS: Assertibles (axiōmata) … FREGE: Thoughts (‘Gedanken’) … 
… are on a par with other complete contents 
like commands and questions (D.L. 7.65–68; 
Prantl 441). 
… are on a par with other complete contents 
like commands and questions (SB38, CP 
167). 
… are expressed in assertoric sentences (or 
have an assertoric formulation) (ekphora 
axiōmatikē) (D.L. 7.67). 
… are expressed in assertoric sentences (T61, 
CP 354). 
 
When we utter an assertoric sentence 
we say the assertible (express assertoric 
content) and we assert the assertible (make 
an assertion) (D.L. 7.57; D.L. 7.66; S.E. M. 
8.71; Prantl 441). 
It is with the uttering (‘aussprechen’) of the 
assertoric sentence that we both express 
(‘ausdrücken’) the thought and assert it (as 
true) or make an assertion (T62, CP 355–
56).36 An assertoric sentence contains the 
thought (T62, CP 355). An assertoric 
sentence contains the assertion of the thought 
(T62, CP 355). 
An assertible is a complete content that can 
be asserted in itself (D.L. 7.65). 
A thought does not require a supplementation 
in order to obtain, but is complete in itself 
(N69). 
… are that which is either true or false (D.L. 
7.65) 
… are the complete contents by saying which 
we say something true or something false 
(S.E. M. 8.73; Prantl 441–42). 
 
‘I call a thought something for which the 
question of truth can arise at all. So I count 
what is false among thoughts no less than 
what is true’ (T60–61, CP 353–54). Every 
thought is either true or false, tertium non 
datur (CT37, 38, CP 391, 392 IL = EidL, NS 
202 = PW 186; FGII398, CP 329; IL, PW 
186; LM, PW 198). 
 
34 ‘Ein Gedanke ist nämlich vollständig und gesättigt, bedarf um bestehen zu können keiner 
Ergänzung’ (CT, CP 391). 
35 Gabriel, Hülser, and Schlotter 2009: 382–83 argue that there is a parallel between, on the one hand, 
Frege’s ‘Fassen des Gedankens’ and ‘Akt der Zustimmung’, and, on the other, the Stoic katalēptikē 
phantasia and katalēpsis. However, this is mistaken. A katalēptikē phantasia is veridical. Frege’s 
‘Akt der Zustimmung’, even though described as an act by which the thought is acknowledged as 
true, is not veridical. (At least this is the general view. For a dissenting interpretation of Frege see 
Kremer 2000.)  
36 T62, CP 356: ‘die Anerkennung der Wahrheit eines Gedankens—[ist] das Urteilen’. (T62, CP 356): 
‘In der Form des Behauptungssatzes sprechen wir die Anerkennung der Wahrheit aus’. 




The Greek term for assertibles (axiōma) 
originates from our acknowledgement of [the 
truth of] what we say (D.L. 7.65).  
We express acknowledgement of truth [of the 
thought] in the form of an assertoric sentence 
(T63, CP 356). 
Grasping a complete content (in a rational 
presentation, phantasia logikē, D.L. 7.49, 51) 
versus acknowledgement of the content 
(sugkatathesis or axiousthai)  
Grasping a thought (‘Fassen eines 
Gedankens’) versus acknowledgement of the 
truth of a thought (‘Anerkennung der 
Wahrheit eines Gedankens’) (T62, CP 355–
56). 
 
Of these parallels, philosophically the most noteworthy are (i) the distinction between saying 
or conveying an assertoric content, on the one hand, and asserting it, on the other; and (ii) the 
account of an assertoric content as that which is (precisely) either true or false, that is, as 
something that has built in both bivalence and the semantic tertium non datur.37 (There is an 
important difference between Stoic assertoric contents and those of Frege: Stoic assertions 
can change their truth-value over time—thus time of utterance is a contextual factor. When it 
is day, ‘it is day’ is true, when it is night, ‘it is day’ is false. Important though it is, this point 




The second significant complete contents are the command-contents. THE STOICS introduced 
the rudiments of a logic of commands and of hybrids that combine assertibles with command-
contents. Chrysippus, for instance, in the Logical Investigations (his only, and only partially, 
surviving work),39 considered whether sentences of the form ‘do x, since q!’ express a 
conditional command, or whether the whole sentence expresses a complex command. This 
important papyrus fragment is not mentioned in Prantl. There is little in Frege that suggests 
he considered a logic of commands. He did however give commands some thought, and what 
we find has parallels in Stoic logic as it is reported by Prantl and the Summary. 
 The Summary has this: ‘A command (prostaktikon) is a [complete] content by saying 
which we command’. It follows an imperative sentence that is meant to provide an example 
(D.L. 7.67; Prantl 441). Sextus has ‘They say that some [of the complete contents] are 
 
37 The principle of bivalence is the semantic principle that every proposition is either true or false. By 
the semantic tertium non datur I mean the principle that no proposition is neither true nor false. 
38 For a thorough treatment of the question how Stoic axiōmata differ from propositions as understood 
in Frege and much of 20th century logic, see Bobzien 1986, 11-39. 
39 See e.g. Barnes 1986. 




commands, [namely] those with which we are commanding when we say them’ (S.E. M. 
8.71; Prantl 441). Shortly after in Sextus’ list, we read that of the complete contents only the 
assertibles are either true or false, i.e. have a truth-value (S.E. M. 8.73; Prantl 441). Since 
what we say, we say using a sentence (logos) (D.L. 7.59, see above), it is implied that the 
content of an imperative sentence is that saying which we (make a) command. This is 
confirmed by a passage from Plutarch (not in Prantl) which makes explicit how imperative 
sentences and commands relate to each other in the Stoic view: the content of the imperative 
sentence ‘do not steal’ is ‘not to steal’ (Plut. St. Rep. 1037D–E). The Stoic choice of the 
expression prostaktikon emphasizes that they thought of commands as a content that is 
available to us to command (prostassō/prostattō) with.40  
 In both SB and his later work, FREGE maintains that commands are on a par with 
thoughts and do not contain thoughts. In SB he states that an imperative (i.e. imperative 
sentence) does not have a ‘Bedeutung’ but only a ‘Sinn’. This ‘Sinn’ of an imperative 
sentence is said to be a command (‘Befehl’).41 In (T62, CP 355), Frege states that an 
imperative sentence has a ‘Sinn’, but that the ‘Sinn’ is not of the kind that could have a truth-
value. This is presented as the reason why the ‘Sinne’ of imperative sentences are not called 
thoughts42—which is in line with Frege’s definition of thought (see above). In sum, for Frege 
imperative sentences have a ‘Sinn’ but no ‘Bedeutung’. The ‘Sinn’ is a command. It cannot 
have a truth-value and hence it is not a thought. (Frege uses ‘command’ (‘Befehl’) both for 
the ‘Sinn’ of an imperatival sentence and for the ‘Bedeutung’ (SB38, CP 167) and/or act of 
commanding—an ambiguity he is aware of for the parallel case of the thought (Logic PW 
137: ‘It would be just as wrong to identify a thought with an act of thinking’;43 cf. T62, n. 3).) 
Note that the above-quoted passages are virtually all Frege seems ever to have written about 
 
40 The Stoics indicate the status of a complete content by the use of neuter adjectival noun expressions 
formed from a verb and ending with -tikon (-τικόν). Probably lekton is understood. 
41 SB38–39: ‘A subordinate clause with “that” after “command”, “ask”, “forbid”, would appear in 
direct speech as an imperative [i.e. imperative sentence]. Such a sentence has no meaning but only a 
sense. […] The meaning of such a clause is therefore not a truth-value but a command, a request, and 
so forth’. (‘Der Nebensatz mit “dass” nach “befehlen”, “bitten”, “verbieten” würde in gerader Rede 
als Imperativ [i.e. Imperativsatz] erscheinen. Ein solcher hat keine Bedeutung, sondern nur einen 
Sinn. […] Die Bedeutung eines solchen Satzes ist also nicht ein Wahrheitswert, sondern ein Befehl, 
eine Bitte, u.dgl.’) 
42 T62, CP 355, LU 34: ‘We should not wish to deny sense to a command, but this sense is not such 
that the question of truth could arise for it. Therefore I shall not call the sense of a command a 
thought’. (‘Einem Befehlssatze wird man einen Sinn nicht absprechen wollen; aber dieser Sinn ist 
nicht derart, dass Wahrheit bei ihm in Frage kommen könnte. Darum werde ich den Sinn eines 
Befehlssatzes nicht Gedanken nennen.’) 
43 Logik NS 148: ‘Ebensowenig ist der Gedanke eine Denktat’. 








STOIC commandable (prostaktikon). FREGEAN command (‘Befehl’). 
The content (lekton) of a command sentence 
is a command-content (D.L. 7.67, implied; 
Plut. St. Rep. 1037D–E, implied). 
The content (‘Sinn’) of a command sentence 
is a command-content (T62, CP 355). 
Command-contents are complete contents that 
are on a par with assertibles (D.L. 7.65–66). 
Command-contents are complete contents 
that are on a par with thoughts (SB38, CP 
167). 
Command-contents cannot be true or false 
and therefore are not assertibles (D.L. 7.68; 
Plut. St. Rep. 1037D–E, implied). 
The sense of a command sentence (i.e. the 
command-content) cannot be true or false 
and therefore is not a thought (SB38, CP 
167) (T62, CP 355). 
By saying a command-content (which we do 
by uttering a command-sentence) we give a 
command (D.L. 7.67). 
(We have a parallel for assertions in (T62–
63, CP 355–56): By means of (uttering) an 
assertoric sentence, we enunciate/pronounce 
(‘sprechen aus’) the recognition of truth (= 
the assertion) of the thought that we express 
with the sentence.) 
 
Today, the view that commands do not have propositional content is a view that is taken quite 
seriously by philosophers. In particular, Jennifer Hornsby’s work shows the lasting 
significance of the Stoic and Fregean non-propositionalism (Hornsby 2016). (The difference 
between commands and utterances with propositional content may also be supported by the 
fact that some animals appear to understand commands, but it may be doubtful whether they 
understand propositions.)  
 
 
III.1.2.3. Sentence questions  
Both parties distinguish between what Frege calls word-questions and sentence-questions 
(D.L. 7.66; Frege: T62, CP 355; SB39, CP 167; PWLB, PW 138–39; N143–45, CP 373–75). 
FREGE considers sentence-questions in SB, T, PWLB, and N. Between SB and the three later 
works, his view appears to have changed somewhat.  
 
44 Frege’s view that logic unfolds the meaning of ‘true’ combined with his view of commands entails 
that for him there can be no logic of commands. Stoic logic, as that (at the level of lekta) which is 
either true or false or neither is not bound by such a constraint.  




 In (SB39, CP 167), in his consideration of subordinate sentences or clauses (SB 36 
‘Betrachtung der Nebensätze’) regarding his ‘Sinn’/‘Bedeutung’ distinction, Frege writes 
‘The case is similar for the dependent question in phrases such as “doubt whether”, “not to 
know what”. It is easy to see that here also the words are to be taken to have their indirect 
meaning. Dependent clauses expressing questions […]’.45 And a little later: ‘i.e. not a truth-
value but a thought, a command, a request, a question’ (SB39, italics mine).46 This passage, 
taken along with its immediate context, implies several things. (i) Frege distinguishes 
interrogative sentences (‘Fragesätze’) and questions. (ii) Questions are the sense (‘Sinn’) of 
interrogative sentences. More precisely, as can be seen from the context, sentence-questions 
are the sense (‘Sinn’), or complete content, of sentence-question interrogative sentences.47 
(iii) Questions are on a par with thoughts, but are not thoughts. (iv) It is implied that by 
saying an interrogative sentence we ask a question. The most pertinent passage is in Thoughts 
(T62, CP 355–56, emphasis mine).  
 
In order to bring out more precisely what I mean by ‘a thought’, I shall distinguish 
various kinds of sentences. […] Propositional questions are a different matter. We 
expect to hear ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The answer ‘yes’ means the same as an assertoric 
sentence, for in saying ‘yes’ the speaker presents as true the thought that was already 
completely contained in the interrogative sentence. This is how a propositional 
question can be formed from any assertoric sentence. […] An interrogative sentence 
and an assertoric one contain the same thought; but the assertoric sentence contains 
something else as well, namely assertion. The interrogative sentence contains 
something more too, namely a request [i.e. to respond]. […] We have already 
performed the first act [i.e. the grasp of a thought] when we form a propositional 
question.48 
 
45 (Writing ‘expressing’ for ‘expression’ in CP.) SB39: ‘Ähnlich ist es bei der abhängigen Frage in 
Wendungen wie “zweifeln, ob”, “nicht wissen, was”. Dass auch hier die Wörter in ihrer ungeraden 
Bedeutung zu nehmen sind, ist leicht zu sehen. Die abhängigen Fragesätze […]’. 
46 ‘d.h. nicht ein Wahrheitswert, sondern ein Gedanke, ein Befehl, eine Bitte, eine Frage’ (italics 
mine). 
47 Frege seems not to be completely consistent in his use of ‘question’ (‘Frage’) and ‘interrogative 
sentence’ (‘Fragesatz’), but the context leaves no doubt that he distinguishes between them as 
indicated. 
48 ‘Um das, was ich einen Gedanken nennen will, schärfer herauszuarbeiten, unterscheide ich Arten 
von Sätzen. […] Anders ist es bei den Satzfragen. Wir erwarten “ja” zu hören oder “nein”. Die 
Antwort “ja” besagt dasselbe wie ein Behauptungssatz; denn durch sie wird der Gedanke als wahr 
hingestellt, der im Fragesatz schon vollständig enthalten ist. So kann man zu jedem Behauptungssatz 





Logic (PW 129, emphasis mine): Truth is only ascribed to the ‘Sinn’ of ‘Behauptungssätzen’.  
 
No one would deny that our predicate [i.e. ‘true’] is, for the most part, ascribed to 
sentences. We are not, however, concerned with sentences expressing wishes, 
questions, requests and commands, but only with assertoric sentences […] In the 
cases which alone concern logic the sense of an assertoric sentence is either true or 
false, and then we have what we call a thought proper.49 
 
And later in the same text (Logic PW 138–39, emphasis mine): 
 
We express the same thought in the question ‘Is oxygen condensable?’ and in the 
sentence ‘Oxygen is condensable’, joining it in the one case with a request and in the 
other with an assertion.50 
 
In these two passages, the content of a sentence-question sentence (‘interrogative sentence’ 
henceforth, for brevity) contains two connected things: a thought (or assertoric content) 
joined with a request for an answer. The expected answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Thus the thought 
that is put forward in a question is not put forward as true or as false. This is only done with 
the answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (T62, CP 355). In fact, Frege introduces interrogative sentences and 
assertoric sentences together in order to bring out by means of an assertoric sentence the 




eine Satzfrage bilden. […] Fragesatz und Behauptungssatz enthalten denselben Gedanken; aber der 
Behauptungssatz enthält noch etwas mehr, nämlich eben die Behauptung. Auch der Fragesatz enthält 
etwas mehr, nämlich eine Aufforderung [i.e. zu antworten]. […] Indem wir eine Satzfrage bilden, 
haben wir die erste Tat [i.e. das Fassen des Gedankens] schon vollbracht’ (T62, LU 34–35, emphasis 
mine). Cf. also PW 7-8 = NG 8. 
49 ‘Am meisten legt man wohl unser Prädikat [i.e. ‘wahr’] Sätzen bei; jedoch sind die Wunsch-, 
Frage-, Aufforderungs-, Befehlssätze auszuschliessen und nur die Behauptungssätze kommen in 
Betracht […] In den für die Logik allein in Betracht kommenden Fällen ist der Sinn eines 
Behauptungssatzes entweder wahr oder falsch, und wir nennen ihn dann einen eigentlichen 
Gedanken’ (Logik NS 140–41, emphasis mine). 
50 ‘In der Frage “ist Sauerstoffgas kondensierbar?” und in dem Satze “Sauerstoffgas ist 
kondensierbar” haben wir denselben Gedanken ausgedrückt, einmal mit einer Aufforderung [i.e. zu 
antworten], das andere Mal mit einer Behauptung verbunden’ (Logik NS 150, emphasis mine). 




[…] since the sense of an interrogative sentence is always also inherent in the 
assertoric sentence that gives an answer to the question […] In any case, we need a 
short term for what can be the sense of an interrogative sentence. I call this a thought. 
(N145, CP 374–75, emphasis mine)51 
  
The key difference between SB, on the one hand, and the later T, PWLB, and N, on the other, 
is as follows: the distinction between the sense of an assertion-sentence as the thought and the 
sense of a question-sentence as a question has been replaced in Thoughts by the distinction 
between, in the interrogative sentence, the combination of a thought as its sense with a 
request for an answer as its force (‘Kraft’), and, in the assertoric sentence, the combination of 
a thought as its sense with an assertion as its force (‘Kraft’). The word ‘question’ is now 
avoided for the content of an interrogative sentence. The distinction between interrogative 
sentence and (sentence) question is still made (in N144, CP 373–74), possibly for the 
combination of the sense with the force of an interrogative sentence. The precise details of 
the change from SB and how it occurred may well be more complex, but for present purposes 
this representation of the difference suffices.  
 THE STOICS describe sentence questions thus: ‘an assertible […] (quoted above); a 
sentence question (erōtēma) is a complete sayable like an assertible but demands an answer, 
for example ‘is it day?’ (literally ‘? It is day’, with ‘?’ for the question particle ‘ara g’). This 
is neither true nor false, hence ‘it is day’ is an assertible, but ‘is it day?’ is a sentence 
question’ (D.L. 7.66; Prantl 441, n. 115; cf. D.L. 7.68; S.E. M. 8.66).52 They contrast 
assertoric content and sentence questions with each other in order to bring out the nature of 
assertoric content (D.L. 7.66, 68). The juxtaposition with axiōmata implies that the Stoics 
distinguish between interrogative sentence and question. By direct analogy with what the 
Stoics say about the other complete content (D.L. 7.66), we expect ‘the interrogative 





51 ‘[…] da der Sinn eines Fragesatzes immer auch in dem Behauptungssatze steckt, in dem die 
Antwort auf die Frage gegeben wird […] Jedenfalls bedarf man einer kurzen Bezeichnung dessen, 
was Sinn eines Fragesatzes sein kann. Ich nenne es Gedanken’ (N145, LU 55–56, emphasis mine). 
52 That sentence questions are neither true nor false is implied also in D.L. 7.68. That an answer of yes 
or no is requested is also implied by S.E. M. 8.66. 





STOIC question (erōtēma). FREGEAN sentence question (‘Satzfrage’) or 
question (‘Frage’). 
Interrogative sentence and sentence-question 
are different things (implied D.L. 7.66–68). 
Interogative sentence (‘Fragesatz’, 
interrogative sentence) and question are 
different things (S39B, CP 167; N144, CP 
37453). 
The sentence-question is a complete content 
(D.L. 7.65–66). 
The sense of an interrogative sentence is 
complete (T62, CP 355). 
The content of an interrogative sentence is a 
sentence-question (D.L. 7.66, implied by 
context). 
The sense of an interrogative sentence is a 
(sentence-)question (SB39, CP 167, implied). 
A sentence-question is like an assertible, but 
requests an answer (D.L. 7.66). 
 
An interrogative sentence contains a thought 
joined with the request for an answer (T62, 
CP 355); (Logik NS 150, Logic PW 138–39 
‘joined’). 
The answer requested is ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (D.L. 
7.66; S.E. M. 8.66, implied). 
The expected answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (T62).54 
Sentence questions are neither true nor false 
(D.L. 7.66; expressly D.L. 7.68). 
‘A thought put forward in a question is not 
put forward as true or as false’ (PWLB) (T62, 
CP 355 implied). 
Sentence questions and assertibles are 
contrasted with each other in order to bring 
out the nature of the assertibles (in particular 
their being true or false) (D.L. 7.66, 68). 
Sentence questions and thought (or thought 
plus assertoric force) are contrasted in order 
to bring out the nature of assertions: i.e. the 
putting forward of the thoughts as true or 
false (T62, CP 355) (N143–45, CP 373–75). 
Sentence questions are on a par with 
assertibles, but are not assertibles (D.L. 7.66, 
implied). 
Sentence questions are on a par with thoughts 
but are not thoughts (SB38–39, CP 167, 
implied). 
 
The table shows that the overlap is extensive. The only clear difference appears to be that, in 
his later work, FREGE holds (i) that sentence-questions have a thought as content (‘Inhalt’), 
but that in the question the thought is without the element of truth-value (N144–47, CP 373–
75); 55 and (ii) that interrogative sentences contain (enthalten) a thought (T62, CP 355); and 
(iii) that the same thought is expressed in a question or interrogative sentence (‘Frage’) and in 
the corresponding assertoric sentence, but without the force of assertion (‘[…] in der Frage 
 
53 ‘Irgendeinen Sinn muss der Fragesatz doch wohl haben, wenn er überhaupt eine Frage enthalten 
soll’. 
54 Implied by what Sextus says about word questions (pusma), S.E. M. 8.66. Implied by ‘expected’, 
(T62, CP 355).  
55 In Negation, Frege explicitly and repeatedly distinguishes between the sentence-question (‘Frage’), 
whose content the thought is and the interrogative sentence (‘Fragesatz’), which expresses that 
thought (N144-147).  




kann man denselben Gedanken ausdrücken wie im Behauptungssatze, aber ohne Behauptung 
[…] behauptender Kraft’, CT38, CP 391, cf. Logik NS 150 = Logic PW 138–39). Since a 
Fregean thought is either true or false, it follows that for Frege now a question (as that which 
is expressed with an interrogative sentence) stands in some relation to the thought’s truth-
value, except that, since neither the thought nor its negation is asserted, that truth-value is not 
acknowledged.  
 STOIC questions are never said to contain an assertible (nor are the corresponding 
interrogative sentences). But recall here my central hypothesis that Frege acquainted himself 
with Stoic logic via Prantl. The difference then becomes far less obvious: Prantl writes that at 
least some Stoics intended a reduction of all non-assertoric complete contents—and this 
includes sentence questions—to assertibles (Prantl 442–43). This is in parallel with the later 
Frege. Prantl then adds that—like assertibles—these non-assertoric contents are capable of 
containing (‘enthalten’) the element of the true and false (Prantl 443, cf. n. 117). This may be 
in line with Frege in CT38, CP 391; it differs from T62, CP 355; N145–6, CP 374–75; Logic, 
NS 150 = PW138–39. Prantl bases his claims on Ammonius (Ammon. Int. 2.26–3.6), whom 
he quotes in n. 117. Ammonius lists five Aristotelian kinds of sentence or speech (logos) and 
adds that the Stoics had five more, which he also lists. Then he adds that ‘all these can take 
falsehood and truth and can be subsumed under the assertoric’. Prantl states that the quoted 
sentence can only be Stoic (Prantl 443, n. 117). He misses that the context strongly suggests 
the opposite, namely that this is Ammonius’ addition, since it is Ammonius’ objective to 
show that the Stoic ten kinds reduce to the Aristotelian five. Prantl then generalizes this point 
to all Stoic non-assertoric complete contents.56 The table on sentence questions can thus be 
supplemented.  
 
PRANTL: The Stoic non-assertoric complete 
contents can be reduced to the assertibles. 
They are capable of containing (‘enthalten’) 
the elements of the true and the false (Prantl 
443, with n. 117). 
FREGE: A sentence question has a thought as 
content (N144–47); an interrogative sentence 
(sentence that expresses a sentence question) 
contains (‘enthält’) a thought (T62, CP 355). 
Implied: the thought expressed with an 
interrogative sentence has a truth-value.  
 
56 ‘[…] einige Stoiker wenigstens eine Zurückführung der übrigen Sätze auf das axiōma beabsichtigt 
zu haben, insoferne nemlich erstere ebenfalls fähig seien, das Moment des Wahren und Falschen in 
sich zu enthalten […]’ (Prantl 442–43). The Stoics may have held that an oath contains an assertible, 
but is neither true nor false because of the additional element of swearing. This would come close to 
Frege’s view that sentences with an emotive particle contain (‘uneigentliche’) thoughts, that is 
thoughts without a truth-value (see Ecl. 1.28.17–19 with Barnes 1999: 201). There is no reason to 
think that Frege knew the Stobaeus passage. 





So, virtually everything we find in Prantl and in the Summary about sentence questions has 
parallels in some of Frege’s work. 
Again, the positions of the Stoics and Frege that a question does not contain an 
assertoric content, or alternatively that there are questions that contain an assertoric content 
but without having an alethic status, may have a philosophical advantage. On such a view, 
one can meaningfully ask questions, even if there is no assertible, nothing that is precisely 
either true or false, that fully corresponds to one’s question. These kinds of position are taken 
up in some recent research on questions, and have applications in, for example, theories of 
vagueness. One can meaningfully ask, ‘Is Sam tall?’, even if one holds the view that (it is 
possible that), in that—non-fictional—context, ‘Sam is tall’ has no settled (or definite or 
determinate) truth-value, and hence is not an assertoric content (axiōma, thought). Of course, 
since in Frege’s radical view on vagueness, vague predicates have no Bedeutung, he would 
have had neither need nor use for this kind of deliberation.  
 
 
III.1.2.4. Quasi-assertibles, the expression of emotion, and apparent or mock thoughts  
For comparison with Frege, perhaps the most fascinating of Stoic complete contents are the 
so-called similar-to-assertibles or, as they are often translated, quasi-assertibles (homoion 
axiōmati, Prantl 442; D.L. 7.67 = Prantl 441, n. 115; Ammon. Int. 2.26–3.6 = Prantl 442, n. 
117) and those that are more than assertibles (pleiona ē axiōmata, S.E. M. 8.73). ‘Quasi-
assertibles’ and ‘more-than-assertibles’ are in fact two Stoic ways of referring to the same 
kind of complete assertible. Prantl, however, presents them separately (Prantl 441, 443). This 
is relevant, since Frege discusses two kinds of complete contents that, each in their own way, 
show remarkable similarities to Prantl’s report from, and representation of, the Stoic position.
   
(i) EMOTIVISM: 
The STOIC definition in the Summary reads: ‘a quasi-assertible is linguistically expressed in 
the way assertibles are (tēn ekphoran ekēon axiōmatikēn), but it falls outside the genus of 
assertibles due to the addition of some particle or some emotion’ (D.L. 7.67; Prantl 441, n. 
115). The examples are ‘(Gee), the Parthenon is beautiful’57 and ‘How the cowherd resembles 
 
57 ὅμοιον δ᾿ἐστὶν ἀξιώματι ὃ τὴν ἐκφορὰν ἔχον ἀξιωματικὴν παρά τινος μορίου πλεονασμὸν ἢ πάθος 
ἔξω πίπτει τοῦ γένους τῶν ἀξιωμάτων with the examples καλός γ᾿ὁ παρθενών. ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν 




Priam’s sons’. Another source mentions that the additional particle for a quasi-assertible is 
‘how’ (ōs) (Ammon. Int. 2.26–3.6; Prantl 441, n. 115, 443, n. 117). This suggests that the 
Stoics use the particle how deliberately as a linguistic indicator that an assertoric sentence 
expresses a quasi-assertible, in line with their general method of language regimentation.58 
(In Greek, the grammatical mood of a sentence does not guarantee that the sentence is used to 
express a Stoic complete content of a particular kind.)59 So, the Stoic quasi-assertibles have 
the grammatical form of an assertoric sentence, either exactly or with an additional particle 
(ge or hōs). They are very similar to assertibles, more so than any other complete content. 
The emotive element either has a lexical correlate in the sentence expressing the quasi-
assertible or it has a correlate in how the sentence is expressed, presumably the intonation 
used. We seem to have examples of both.  
 The distinction the Stoics are after is philosophically significant. It is between 
assertible contents and contents that are expressed in sentences of very similar, or identical, 
form, but that are considered not assertible because they contain an additional element of 
emotion. They are, in some sense, more than an assertible. The emotive element is 
additional. This emotive element is part of the content, and, or so the Stoics believe, someone 
who says such an emotion-infused content does not make an assertion. Moreover, qua being 
part of the content, this element of emotion is something all humans can, in principle, share 
in. When we say such quasi-assertibles, we do something other than asserting. Some later 
sources suggest, for example, that what we do is marvel or admire (Prantl 442; Simpl. in Cat. 
406.20–26; Prantl 443, n. 117).60 Compare an assertion that ‘She is strong’ with ‘How strong 
she is!’, or ‘Wow, she is strong’ or ‘She is strong’ (with an intonation of wonder or similar). 
When we marvel, the content of our assertoric sentence is not truth-evaluable. Unlike an 
assertible, a quasi-assertibles is neither true nor false (D.L. 7.67–68). In Sextus, the quasi-
assertibles are described as ‘more-than-assertibles’ (S.E. M. 8.73; Prantl 441, n. 115) and are 
explicitly said not to be assertibles. Context implies that they have no truth-value. It is not an 
asserting (of a content that indicates recognition of the truth of what we say), but a 
 
ἐμφερὴς ὁ βουκόλος (D.L. 7.67). It is not clear whether the ge counts as such a particle, and hence 
whether and how to translate the ge. Is this LSJ s.v. II.4? If so, maybe as ‘gee’, ‘gosh’, or ‘golly’. 
58 The regimentation requires putting particles, as far as is grammatically felicitous, towards the 
beginning of sentences that express complete contents. See Bobzien and Shogry, forthcoming, 
Atherton and Blank 2003: 314–16, and Barnes, Bobzien, and Mignucci 1999: 96–97; also Frede 1974.  
59 Barnes 1999: 200; Bobzien and Shogry, forthcoming; also Prantl 442, in a woolly way. 
60 E.g. Simpl. in Cat. 406.20–26, cited in Prantl 443, n. 117. Further sources, which are hard to access, 
have been collected as 899, 900, 900A, 900B in Hülser 1987, frgs FDS 1118–22.  




marvelling—an expression of an emotional perspective on an aspect of the world. Perhaps 
something surpasses our expectation to a point that motivates us to express our surprise—to 
marvel out loud, as it were. So what I say when I say ‘Wow, she is strong’ is not truth-
evaluable, although it is similar to the truth-evaluable ‘She is strong’. The Stoics did not 
think of quasi-assertibles as a combination of an assertible with an emotive element, such that 
by saying them we would (i) assert them and (ii) express an emotion. The Stoics thus 
maintain an emotivist position, not specifically for moral statements but for the content of 
declarative sentences with which, by means of the content that elicits an emotion, that 
emotion is expressed. 
FREGE, too, considers assertoric sentences that express an element of emotion.61 In the 
Gedanke he writes:  
 
An assertoric sentence often contains over and above a thought and assertion, a third 
component […] meant to act on the feeling and mood of the listener. Words like ‘alas’ 
and ‘luckily’ belong here.  
(T63, CP 356)  
 
And a little later, 
 
Thus the content of a sentence often goes beyond the thought expressed by it.  
(T64, CP 357)62  
 
Neither adverbial expressions like ‘alas’ nor exclamative particles like ‘oh’ are necessary. In 
his posthumous Logik, Frege writes: 
 
We can substitute words like ‘oh’ and ‘unfortunately’ for [an emotional] tone of voice 
without altering the thought.  
(PWLB, PW 140)63  
 
61 This parallel is also mentioned by Gabriel, Hülser, and Schlotter 2009: 385. 
62 ‘Ein Behauptungssatz enthält außer einem Gedanken und der Behauptung oft noch ein Drittes […]. 
Das soll nicht selten auf das Gefühl, die Stimmung des Hörers wirken oder seine Einbildungskraft 
anregen. Wörter wie “leider”, “gottlob” gehören hierher’ (T63). ‘So überragt der Inhalt eines Satzes 
nicht selten den in ihm ausgedrückten Gedanken’ (T64). 
63 ‘Diesen Klang der Stimme kann man auch durch Wörter wie “ach”, “leider” ersetzen, ohne am 
Gedanken etwas zu ändern’ (Logik NS 152). 





Just like the Stoics, Frege suggests that the content of such sentences goes beyond that of an 
assertoric content (a thought, for Frege), and that what goes beyond ‘does not belong to the 
thought’ (T63, CP 357). And just like the Stoics, Frege suggests that that which goes beyond 
can be expressed either by intonation alone, or by certain linguistic indicators of emotion 
such as ‘oh’. 
Frege and the Stoics differ on the issue of whether what is expressed by such 
‘emotive’ sentences is truth-evaluable. The Stoics are clear that the answer is ‘no’ (see 
above). Frege (in T, N, and PWLB) thinks of the content expressed as a composite, including 
a thought, an assertion, and something extra (T62–63, CP 357). And by way of the thought, 
what is expressed is truth-evaluable and the truth-value is independent of the emotive element 
(PWLB, PW 140) (‘If someone announces the news of a death in a sad tone of voice without 
actually being sad, the thought expressed is still true’).64 (Note the difference to Fregean 
sentence questions. For Frege, the sentence ‘Is she strong?’ contains a thought but not an 
assertion. In contrast, ‘Wow, she is strong’ contains both a thought and an assertion.) The 
difference between Frege and the Stoics concerning truth-evaluability does not conflict with 
the hypothesis that Frege draws on Prantl for Stoic thought. For, once more, Frege and 
Prantl’s Stoics are in agreement. Prantl misreads Ammonius’ testimony on Stoic complete 
contents (see previous section on questions) and writes that Stoic complete contents that are 
not assertibles are still ‘able to contain in themselves the True and the False’.65 This is very 
much like what Frege writes.  
 
 
EMOTIONAL CONTENT IN ASSERTORIC SENTENCES 
STOIC ‘more-than-assertibles’ (pleiona ē 
axiōmata) (D.L. 7.67; Prantl 441, n. 115). 
FREGEAN assertoric sentences containing 
more than thought and assertion (T63, CP 
356). 
Emotional element expressed either by 
additional particle or by tone of voice (D.L. 
7.67; Prantl 441, n. 115). 
Emotion-eliciting element expressed either 
by additional particle or adverb, or by 
intonation or emphasis (T63, CP 356; PWLB, 
PW 140). 
 
64 ‘Wenn jemand eine wahre Todesnachricht mit einer traurigen Stimme ausspricht, ohne wirklich 
traurig zu sein, so ist der ausgedrückte Gedanke dennoch wahr’ (Logik NS 152). Frege’s test for truth 
evaluability is epistemic (Logic 152, PW 140); the Stoics would presumably reject the test. 
65 ‘[…] fähig seien, das Moment des Wahren und Falschen in sich zu enthalten’ (443, read together 
with n. 117, ‘δεκτικά ὂντα ψεύδους τε καὶ ἀλήθειας […] aus dem Munde stoischer Anschauungen’. 




Go beyond assertibles by an emotional 
element (are not assertibles) (D.L. 7.67; 
Prantl 441, n. 115). 
Go beyond the thought cum assertion by an 
emotional (emotion-eliciting) element (T63, 
CP 356). 
Stoics: are neither true nor false (emotivism) 
(implied D.L. 7.67; S.E. M. 8.73; Prantl 441, 
n. 115). 
(See below.) 
Prantl: contain (‘enthalten’) in them the True 
and the False (Prantl 443, based on Ammon. 
Int. 2.26–3.6; Prantl 443, n. 117). 
Contain a thought and assertion, and hence 
are true or false (T62, CP 356–57 implied—
perhaps unclear; PWLB, PW 140 unclear). 
 
There is a difference between the Stoics and Frege regarding the emotive element. For 
the Stoics, it regards the emotion that the speaker (has or pretends to have and) expresses. For 
Frege, it regards the emotions the speaker intends to elicit in the listeners. Emotive language 
of course fulfils both functions. 
 
(ii) MOCK THOUGHTS: 
Interestingly, Frege also discusses cases of complete contents that are very similar to 
thoughts, and of which he says in at least some of his writings that they are neither true nor 
false. These are Frege’s infamous ‘Scheingedanken’: apparent thoughts or mock thoughts.66 
These mock thoughts display the feature of the Stoic quasi-assertibles which Frege’s 
emotion-laden thoughts lack, i.e. the absence of alethic values.  
In his PWLB, Frege suggests that mock thoughts (i) are expressed by/in assertoric 
sentences; (ii) are neither true nor false (cf. Prantl 443 ‘because of the less simple form only 
similar to the true, but not themselves true’);67 and (iii) are not thoughts, but (iv) only 
apparent thoughts. He also says (v) that when we express a mock thought in an assertoric 
sentence, we do not have an assertion but, rather, an apparent assertion. The similarity of 
Frege’s apparent thoughts to Stoic quasi-assertibles is evident (all in Logik NS 141–42 = 
PWLB, PW 130). In some other places, Frege propounds the view that contents such as those 
he discusses in Logik (NS 141–42 = PWLB, PW 130) are thoughts but have no ‘Bedeutung’, 
and, when expressed, we do not have assertions but only pseudo/mock-assertions (e.g. Letter 
to Russell, 28.12.1902, PMC 152; 13.11.1904, PMC 165). (Generally, Frege situates mock 
thought mostly in fiction. The Stoics employ examples from literature for their quasi-
 
66 PWLB, PW 130: ‘the writer […] has his eye on appearances (‘Schein’)’. A ‘Schein’ x is what looks 
like an x but is not an x. 
67 ‘[…] wegen der weniger einfachen Form dem Wahren bloss ähnlich, nicht aber selbst wahr’. 








APPARENT ASSERTORIC CONTENT 
STOIC quasi-assertibles (homoion axiōmati) 
(D.L. 7.67; Prantl 441, n. 115; Ammon. Int. 
2.9–6.3; Prantl 441, n. 117). 
FREGEAN mock thought (‘Scheingedanke’) 
(Logik NS 141–42 = PWLB, PW 130). 
Said by using assertoric sentences (D.L. 7.67; 
Prantl 441, n. 115). 
Expressed in/by assertoric sentences (Logik 
NS 141 = PWLB, PW 130). 
Neither true nor false (Implied D.L. 7.67; 
S.E. M. 8.73; Prantl 441, n. 115). 
Neither true nor false (Logik NS 141–42 = 
PWLB, PW 130, implied Letters to Russell 
from 28.12.1902, PMC 152; 13.11.1904, 
PMC 165). 
Not assertibles and do not contain assertibles 
(D.L. 7.65–68, implied by context). 
Not (‘eigentliche’) thoughts, do not contain 
thoughts (implied, Logik NS 142 = PWLB, 
PW 130). 
Similar to assertibles (D.L. 7.67, implied by 
name). 
Apparent thoughts and apparent assertions 
(Logik NS 141–42 = PWLB, PW 130).  
 
Frege’s two cases do not fully correspond to Prantl’s two mentions of Stoic quasi-assertibles 
and more-than-assertibles. Rather, there are two Fregean kinds of complete contents, each of 
which exemplifies several features of the Stoic quasi-assertibles and similar-to-assertibles, as 
Prantl reports them. Frege’s mock thoughts have more in common with Prantl’s quasi-
assertibles (443) and Frege’s more-than-thoughts with Prantl’s more-than-assertibles (441).  
 
 
III.1.2.5. Word questions: two kinds of completeness of content 
The Stoics and Frege agree that, like sentence questions, word questions request an answer. 
STOICS: inquiries (pusmata) are that by saying which we inquire (punthanometha), e.g. 
‘where does Dion live?’ (D.L. 7.66; S.E. M. 8.71–72; Prantl 441). FREGE: ‘In a word-
question we utter an incomplete sentence, which is meant to be given a true sense just by 
means of the completion for which we are asking’ (T62, CP 355).68 The texts on word 
questions do, however, reveal a difference in how the two parties look at complete contents. 
For the STOICS, word questions express a complete content (D.L. 7.65–66). For FREGE, word-
 
68 ‘In einer Wortfrage sprechen wir einen unvollständigen Satz aus, der erst durch die Ergänzung, zu 
der wir auffordern, einen wahren [= genuine] Sinn erhalten soll’ (LU 34–35). 




questions do not express a genuine complete sense (T62, CP 355). Nor do exclamations, 
since one cannot form a corresponding sentence question (T62, CP 355). This exemplifies the 
use of different criteria by the Stoics and Frege for what counts as complete. For Frege, ‘who 
has the key?’ has no corresponding (complete) ‘Sinn’, even if the context of utterance is 
taken into account. All there is is the ‘Sinn’ fragment, or function, ‘[…] has the key’. By 
contrast, for Frege a command such as ‘close the door!’ provides the addressee in its context, 
which presumably is relevant for making it express a Fregean complete sense. For a word 
question, the context of utterance does not provide the answer and thus leaves the thought 
incomplete. For THE STOICS, we may assume that a word question is a complete move in the 
language game. There is nothing missing. A second Stoic kind of complete sayable that 
confirms this are addresses (prosagoreutika, D.L. 7.66–67). An example is ‘most magnificent 
son of Atreus, leader of men, Agamemnon’ (D.L. 7.67). Addresses are explicitly counted 
among the complete sayables. The criteria for completeness of Frege and Stoics are thus de 




III.1.2.6. Complete contents expressed with indexicals  
So both Frege and the Stoics expressly consider the case in which the content of an assertoric 
sentence goes beyond that of an assertoric content (T64, CP 357–58; Logik NS 150 = PWLB, 
PW 139; S.E. M. 8.70–73; Prantl n. 115; Prantl 443). Both comment on the fact that the 
opposite can also happen: ‘that the mere wording does not suffice for the expression of the’ 
assertoric content, to borrow Frege’s formulation (T64, CP 358; Logik NS 150–51 = PWLB, 
PW 139). Examples are sentences such as ‘I am cold (‘ich friere’)’ (Logik NS 146, PW 134) 
or ‘this one is walking’ (D.L. 7.70). More specifically, both had to show how their theory of 
incorporeal content can cope with the fact that such sentences alone are insufficient to 
express a complete content. It is for this purpose, it seems, that each introduced a basic theory 
of indexicals and context sensitivity.  
 Sentences like the examples above immediately raise a number of philosophical 
questions. They can be used to express different content in different contexts. Still, speakers 
uttering them usually succeed in unambiguously expressing a complete content. What is this 
content? How do they succeed in using such sentences? What are the truth-conditions for 
such content? How do we mention such contents? How is the content of, for example, ‘I am 
cold’ when Sam says it related to the content of ‘Sam is cold’? Do the contents have the same 




semantic value? Are they the same assertoric contents? Both the Stoics and Frege appear to 
have considered most of these questions. 
 THE STOICS’ main emphasis is on sentences with demonstratives, like ‘this one’. They 
are aware that a sentence like ‘this one is walking’ expresses different things in different 
contexts. They called such sentences deictic sentences (S.E. M. 8.96, ta kata deixin 
ekpheromena; Prantl 444, n. 119) and held that, in order for them to express anything, they 
must be accompanied by an act of pointing. A (simple) deictic assertible is said to be 
composed of a predicate and a deictic referent (deiktikē ptōsis, D.L. 7.70; Prantl 444). They 
called the assertibles expressed in this way deictic assertibles (katagoreutikon, ibid.). The 
deictic referent is what is at the receiving end of the pointing. The pointing need not be done 
with a finger or hand, but apparently can be a nodding with the chin, when saying ‘I’ (egō) 
(Gal. PHP 2.2). A successful assertion of a deictic assertible requires that the speaker 
combines the deictic sentence with a pointing at the deictic referent. The standard way of 
mentioning a deictic assertible was: ‘this one, pointing at Dion, is asleep’ (Alex. An. Pr. 
177.25–178.1; Prantl 464–65: ‘wenn bei dem Aussprechen des Satzes “wenn Dion gestorben 
ist, ist dieser gestorben” zugleich mit dem Finger auf Dion hingezeigt werde’).69  
 The most noteworthy aspect of the Stoic theory of indexicals is that they are very 
clear that pairs of sentences like the following express two different contents:  
 
(1) Dio walks. 
(2) This one (with a pointing at Dio) walks.  
 
These express two different assertibles. First, their truth-values can differ. ‘Dio walks’ is true 
when Dio walks. By contrast, ‘this one walks’, with a pointing at Dio, is true when that which 
is pointed at walks (S.E. M. 8.100; cf. Prantl 465). Its truth-conditions are expressed without 
use of a proper name. Second, the assertibles expressed by (1) and (2) have different 
existence conditions. For (2), pointing at Dio, to exist, the non-verbally indicated object must 
exist, so that it can be pointed at. By contrast, since in (1) a proper name refers to an object, 
we can say something about the object even when it no longer exists (Alex. An. Pr. 177.25–
178.1; Prantl 464–65, n. 166). The deictic assertibles have stricter requirements for 
assertibility than those with proper names. For their assertion, it must be possible to point at 
 
69 The details of the Stoic theory of deixis are controversial. Luckily, they are not required here. I also 
disregard any irrelevant metaphysical details. 




the deictic referent. In (1), by contrast, the proper name has some content (the orthos ptōsis) 
that warrants assertibility, even when the referent of the proper name has ceased to exist. 
When Dion is dead, (1) is false and cannot be true (ibid.). Our texts imply that, for the Stoics, 
even when Dio is alive, ‘this one is dead’ (with ‘this one’ for Dio) cannot be asserted without 
Dio being in pointing distance.  
 FREGE tackles the very same problem as the Stoics in his T, when he says that often 
‘the sentence alone is not enough for the expression of a thought’, and this is particularly so 
when the sentence contains an indexical. We learn that ‘the complete expression of the 
thought’ may require ‘finger pointing, hand gestures, and glances’. This is just what the 
Stoics suggest. Frege also remarks that sentences with indexicals express different thoughts 
when used by different people, in which case one thought can be true, the other false (all in 
T64, CP 358). The case Frege investigates in detail is a sentence that involves the first person 
pronoun ‘I’ rather than a demonstrative. Frege considers the question whether the sentence  
 
(3) Dr Gustav Lauben was wounded 
 
expresses the same thought as the sentence  
 
 (4) I was wounded (when said by Dr Gustav Lauben) (T64-5, CP 358).  
 
His verdict is ‘no’: (3) and (4) express different thoughts. The similarity to the Stoics is 
striking. Where the Stoic argument is primarily metaphysical, Frege’s is epistemic: someone 
who doesn’t know that the person uttering (4) was Gustav Lauben cannot know that (3) and 
(4) concern the same person (T65, CP 358–59). We can safely assume that the thought 
expressed by (4) cannot be expressed when Dr Lauben is not present. 70 
 Frege is silent on the question of whether there can be situations in which what is 
expressed with (3) and what is expressed with (4) do not share a truth-value. He expressly 
states that, as long as the referent of different proper names is the same, thoughts that differ 
only with regard to those names will have the same truth-value (T66, CP 359). He is also 
 
70 In some of his earlier work, Frege writes that one can obtain the same thought if a third person uses 
a name instead of the first person using ‘I’ (Logic PW 134-5). It is quite possible that in this passage 
Frege has the specific circumstances in mind in which a third person is present. If this is so, there is 
no significant difference to Frege’s view as expressed in Thoughts.  




clear that different sentences can express the thought expressed by (4). For example, he 
writes that Gustav Lauben may say  
 
(5) The one who is now speaking to you was wounded  
 
(‘by doing this he makes the conditions accompanying his utterance serve toward the 
expression of a thought’,71 T66, CP 360).72 Perhaps the same thought is still expressed if 
someone else present says ‘the one who just spoke was wounded’.  
Another question on which Frege is silent is whether there can be situations in which 
the thought expressed by (3) can be asserted but the thought expressed by (4) cannot. Unlike 
Stoic assertibles, Fregean thoughts are defined as being eternal. So the Stoic view cannot be 
Frege’s. However, the fact that a thought is eternal does not entail that it can be expressed or 
asserted at all times. In fact, it is compatible with what we know of the later Frege that he 
then believed that sentences of type (4) cannot be expressed by using a proper name or 
definite description in its subject place: the Lauben example strongly suggests this. It seems 
then that for the late Frege there are situations in which the thought that corresponds to an 
indexical sentence cannot be expressed. (Suggested by T65–66, CP 358–60 and by (4) and 
(5) above in particular.) Compare also Key Sentences on Logic 9 (PW 174): ‘the sentence 
“this table is round” is the expression of a thought only if the words “this table” are not empty 
sounds but designate something specific for me’ (Kernsätze zur Logik 10 (NS 189)).73 This 
suggests that, eternity notwithstanding, when it is not possible to indicate the subject of the 
thought via indexical expressions (plus gesture, where required), the thought cannot be 
asserted. The eternity of thoughts would also be compatible with the assumption that 
indexical thoughts are, as it were, silenced for good when the possibility no longer exists of 
expressing them via indexical expressions (plus gesture, where required). Metaphysical 




71 ‘wobei er die sein Sprechen begleitenden Umstände dem Gendankenausdrücke dienstbar macht’ 
(LU 40).  
72 This fact suggests that Frege’s mysterious unconveyable ‘I’-thoughts are not those expressed by (4) 
and (5), but are a third kind of thoughts that are of minor interest for logic. 
73 ‘[…] ist der Satz “dieser Tisch ist rund” nur dann Ausdruck eines Gedankens, wenn die Worte 
“dieser Tisch” mir etwas Bestimmtes bezeichnen, nicht leere Worte sind’. 




ASSERTORIC CONTEXTS THAT ARE EXPRESSED WITH INDEXICALS 
STOICS: There are assertoric sentences that 
are, on their own, insufficient to express an 
axiōma and need to be supplemented by 
deixis, gesture (D.L. 7.70; Alex. An. Pr. 
177.25–178.1; Prantl 464–65). 
FREGE: There are assertoric sentences that 
are, on their own, insufficient to express a 
thought and need to be supplemented by 
finger pointings (‘Fingerzeige’), gestures, 
glances (T64, T65, CP 358). 
We mention such sentences by 
supplementing them with a phrase, ‘pointing 
at x’ where x is the referent of the 
demonstrative (Alex. An. Pr. 177.25–178.1; 
Prantl 464–65). Such pointings are not 
restricted to finger pointings, but also include 
e.g. gesturing with one’s chin. 
We mention such sentences by 
supplementing them with a phrase (T66, CP 
360), ‘by doing this he makes the conditions 
accompanying his utterance serve toward the 
expression of a thought’ (T64, CP 358): Such 
‘Umstände’ can include ‘Pointing the finger, 
hand gestures, glances’, (‘Fingerzeige, 
Handbewegungen, Blicke’).  
The truth-conditions for such assertoric 
content require that the predicate holds of 
that which is pointed at (S.E. M. 8.100; 
implied Prantl 464–65). 
(The truth-conditions for such assertoric 
content are not given. Context implies that 
they have a truth-value.) 
Discuss two sentences that differ only in that 
their subject expression is once a name or 
definite description, once an indexical 
expressed together with deixis and which 
express different axiōmata (Alex. An. Pr. 
177.25–178.1; Prantl 464–65). 
Discusses two sentences that differ only in 
that their subject expression is once a name 
or definite description, once an indexical 
expressed together with deixis and which 
express different thoughts (T64–66, CP 358–
59). 
Argue that these express different assertibles 
(ibid.). 
Argues that these express different thoughts 
(T64–66, CP 358–59). 
In the normal cases, i.e. when they can both 
be expressed, these have the same truth-value 
(Alex. An. Pr. 177.25–178.1; Prantl 464–65, 
implied). 
In normal cases, i.e. when they can both be 
expressed, these have the same truth-value 
(T65–66, CP 358–59, implied). 
There are situations in which the assertible 
that corresponds to an indexical sentence 
with deixis cannot be expressed (Alex. An. 
Pr. 177.25–178.1; Prantl 464–65). 
Conjecture: There are situations in which the 
thought that corresponds to an indexical 
sentence cannot be expressed. (Suggested by 
T64–66, CP 358–60 and by (4) and (5) above 
in particular and Kernsätze zur Logik 10.)  
 
 
III.1.3. Propositional logic and (more) language regimentation 
The second main subject area in which parallels between Frege and the Stoics abound is that 
of the elements of propositional logic. As with our first area, some of these parallels have 
been noted before, in particular the definition of material implication. However, nobody has 
yet exposed the vast extent to which there is overlap in terminology, choice of topics, and 




theory. This section is structured by the different kinds of molecular assertoric contents 
(propositions from here on, for brevity) and any closely related notions.  
Unlike the predominant contemporary classification of atomic and molecular 
propositions, THE STOICS distinguished simple and non-simple assertibles. The simple ones 
are atomic assertibles, their negations (literals, in contemporary jargon), and any negations of 
simple assertibles. In his late published essay triad, Frege deals with negation in one essay 
and with what he calls compound thoughts, which are analogous to Stoic non-simple 
assertibles, in another. Simple negations are not compound thoughts. For comparison, on the 
one hand, Russell introduces negation in his Principles of Mathematics in terms of the 
conditional (‘implication’, Russell 1903, 16–17) and in ‘Mathematical Logic as Based on the 
Theory of Types’ he introduces negation and disjunction in one breath, and then defines the 
conditional in terms of negation and disjunction (Russell 1908, 244–45). On the other hand, 
standard logic texts, all in the Aristotelian tradition, tend to introduce affirmation/negation or 
assertion/denial in term-logical form and then, after presenting Aristotelian syllogistic, briefly 
mention hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms, also generally in term-logical garb (if A is 
B, then C is D; a is either F or G).74 So what the Stoics and Frege have in common is the 
combination of non-term-logically defined assertoric contents with the introduction and 
treatment of simple negations independently of their compound propositions. 
 
III.1.3.1.1. Negation   
Frege’s Negation (N) and Prantl’s discussion of Stoic negation both show clearly that the 
notion of negation that classical propositional logic takes for granted was not at all intuitive at 
a time when Aristotelian logic set the standard (Arist. De Int., esp. chapters 5–6). While 
Aristotle distinguishes between assertion and denial,75 Stoic and Fregean negations have the 
same assertoric force as Stoic and Fregean affirmations (e.g. D.L. 7.69; Prantl 444, n. 120; 
Frege: N154, CP 384; Logik NS 164 = PW 152; EidL, NS 201 = PW 185; Kurze Übersicht, 
NS 214=PW 197). Both Prantl’s criticism of the Stoics (Prantl 444–45, 449–50) and Frege’s 
defence of his negation (N152–55, CP 382–86) have to be read in this wider context.  
 A STOIC negation (apophatikon) is an assertible (D.L. 7.69; Prantl 444). It is 
syntactically defined iteratively as formed from an assertible and a negation part ‘not’ (D.L. 
7.69; Prantl 445, n. 121). An example for a negation is ‘not: it is day’ (D.L. 7.69; Prantl 444, 
 
74 Cf. e.g. Ulrici 1852, who goes on to deny the existence of hypothetical propositions. 
75 This is a position that has regained some popularity with Ian Rumfitt’s contemporary uptake of 
Aristotle’s view in Rumfitt 2000.  




n. 119; Prantl has the Apuleius passage, 445, n. 121). Stoic language regimentation requires 
the use of the negation particle ouchi (‘not:’ or ‘it is not the case that’) as an indicator of 
scope to be placed at the beginning of the sentence that expresses the negation (Apul. Herm. 
191.6–11, cui negativa particula praeponitur; Prantl 445; also S.E. M. 8.90). 
 The NEGATION PART is sometimes called ‘negative’ (apophasis, S.E. M. 8.89, 103), 
sometimes ‘negation’ or ‘negative [part]’ (apophatikon, Alex. An. Pr. 402; FDS 921, 
apophatikon [morion]). The term ‘apophatikon’ is also used for the whole negative assertible. 
Presumably in one case ‘assertible’ (axiōma) is understood, in the other ‘part(icle)’ 
(‘morion’) (see Apuleius’ negativa particula at Herm. 191.6–11; Prantl 445, n. 121). STOIC 
NEGATIONS CAN BE OF simple or NON-SIMPLE ASSERTIBLES. A Stoic example of the negation of a 
non-simple assertible is: ‘Not [both] Plato is dead and Plato is alive’. These were called 
negation of a conjunction (D.L. 7.80 plus context, S.E. PH 2.182 plus context, 226 plus 
context, all in Prantl 473–74, n. 182). This contrasts with the Peripatetic term ‘negative 
conjunction’.76 The TRUTH-CONDITIONS of the negation can be gauged from a passage that 
tells us that ‘when “it is day” is true, “not: it is day” is false, and vice versa’ (S.E. M. 8.103; 
cf. Prantl 449–450). So, Stoic negation is truth-functional. There is no difference in ‘FORCE’ 
between Stoic affirmations and negations. They are each assertoric contents that can be 
asserted (are apophantikos): the Stoic definition of axiōma as assertible covers negations. 
FREGE discusses negations in detail in his Negation (Die Verneinung) (N), and in 
shorter form in Logik (NS 161–62, PW 149–50), EidL (NS 201, PW 185), Kurze Übersicht 
(NS 214, PW 198), and at the beginning of CT. Negations are assertoric contents formed 
from an assertoric content and a negation [function] (N155, CP 386): the negation of a 
thought is a thought (N156, CP 387) and the negation [function] requires supplementation 
with a thought (N155, CP 386; CT37 CP 391). The account of negation is thus iterative. In 
Negation, Frege introduces and uses the operator ‘die Verneinung von …’ (N155–57, CP 
385–89). In CT, Frege frequently expresses a negation by ‘not A’ (so explained at e.g. CT40, 
CP 394 and used passim in CT for sentence schemata: CT40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 
51 CP 394, 395, 396, 398, 399, 400, 401, 403, 404, 405, 406). Either way, the negator stands 
at the beginning of the negation—just as the negation stroke (‘Verneinungsstrich’) in Begr. 
Frege uses the term negation (‘Verneinung’) both for the negation function and for the 
complete negative thought (e.g. N155, 157, CP 386, 388–89). Frege offers ‘not [A and B]’ as 
an example of a NEGATION OF A COMPOSITE ASSERTORIC CONTENT. He calls such composite 
 
76 Cf. Bobzien 2014, section 2.1. 




contents negations (CT40, CP 393) and not negative conjunctions; the latter is common in 
nineteenth-century logic.  
 Regarding TRUTH-CONDITIONS, he writes that of two assertoric contents A and the 
negation of A, one is true and one is false: Of the two thoughts A and the negation of A, 
always one and only one is true (N157, CP 389).  
 Negation belongs to the content, not to the force of a judgement (‘Urtheil’): a 
negation is asserted, not an affirmative content denied (Begr 4, §4: ‘Verneinung haftet am 
Inhalte’, Begr 10 §7: assertion of negation (not denial) 10; N153–55, CP 383–86). There is no 
difference in ‘FORCE’ between affirmations and negations. They are each assertoric contents 
that can be asserted (‘behauptet’) (Logik NS 161 = PWLB, PW 149; EidL NS 201 = PW 185; 
N154, CP 384–85).  
 Both Frege and Stoics have the negator at the level of content (Frege N155, CT37; 
S.E. M. 8.89, 90). Frege explicitly distinguishes from this the word that expresses the negator 
at the linguistic level (N155, CT37). In ancient non-Stoic sources that do not distinguish 
between linguistic expressions and their content, the distinction can be blurred (Apul. Herm. 
191.6–11). Frege uses ‘Verneinung’ (for the negation function) and ‘Verneinungswort’ for 
the part of the sentence that expresses the ‘Verneinung’ (N67).  
 
NEGATION 
STOIC negation (apophatikon). FREGEAN negation (‘Verneinung’). 
The word apophatikon is used both for 
the negation particle and for the negative 
assertible (D.L. 7.69 (assertible); Plut. 
Quaest. Convivales 8.9.3 (assertible); 
Prantl 449 (‘Verneinung’: used for both); 
S.E. M. 8.90 (assertible); Alex An. Pr. 
402 (negator)). 
The word Verneinung is used both for the 
negation function and for the negative 
thought (N155, 157, CP 386, 388–89). 
The negation is an assertible (D.L. 7.69; 
Prantl 444). 
 
The negation of a thought is a thought 
(N156, CP 387). 
 
It is formed from an assertible and a 
negation part ‘not’ (D.L. 7.69; Prantl 445 
n. 121). 
The negation [function] requires 
supplementation with a thought (N155, 
CP 386; CT37, CP 391). 
The linguistic expression of the negation 
part is prefixed to the assertion it negates 
(Apul. Herm. 191.6–11; Prantl 445, n. 
121). 
The linguistic expression of the negation 
is at the front of the sentence expressing 
the negation. (N155–57, CP 385–89, ‘die 
Verneinung von’; ‘Nicht( )’. So 
announced (CT40, CP 394) and used 
passim in CT for sentence schemata. 




The definition of negation is iterative. The definition of negation is iterative. 
A Stoic example for the negation of a 
non-simple assertible is ‘Not [both] Plato 
is dead and Plato is alive’. Such 
assertibles were called negation of a 
conjunction (D.L. 7.80; S.E. PH 2.182; 
Prantl 473–74, n. 182). 
Frege’s example of the negation of a 
compound thought is ‘not[A and B]’.  
This is called ‘negation of a compound 
thought (of the first kind)’ (CT40, CP 
393, italics mine). 
When ‘it is day’ is true, ‘not: it is day’ is 
false, and vice versa (S.E. M. 8.103; cf. 
Prantl 449–50). 
Of the two thoughts A and the negation of 
A, always one and only one is true (N157, 
CP 389). 
The force of negations is assertoric 
(entailed by the definition of axiōma) 
(D.L. 7.68–70 with 65). 
The force of negations is assertoric (Begr 
4, 10, Logik NS 161 = PWLB, PW 149; 




III.1.3.1.2. Contradictories  
One essential role of the negation is in the definition of contradictories (antikeimenon). For 
THE STOICS, the notion of contradictoriness (or of pairs of complementary literals) is central 
to their propositional logic (Bobzien 2019). Syntactically, they define contradictory 
assertibles as ‘those in which the one surpasses the other by a negation [particle]’ (S.E. M. 
8.89; Prantl 449). Semantically, they say that ‘two assertibles are contradictories 
(antikeimena) with respect to truth and falsehood when one is the negation of the other (D.L. 
7.73; Prantl 450 ‘that of two contradictory opposites only one can be true’ (‘dass von zwei 
contradictorischen Gegentheilen nur das eine wahr sein […] könne’). Prantl translates the 
Stoic antikeimenon also as ‘sprachlicher Widerspruch’ (Prantl 460)—again, he ignores the 
fact that Stoic assertibles are not linguistic entities.  
 Like the Stoics, FREGE maintains that the contradictory of a thought is composed of 
that thought and the negation [function] (N155, CP 386), and holds that of contradictories one 
is true, the other false: ‘For every thought there is a contradictory thought so that a thought is 
declared false by the acknowledgement of its contrary as true’ (N154, CP 385). ‘The sentence 
that expresses the contradictory thought is formed by means of a negation word from the 
expression of the original thought’ (N67).77  
 At first blush, the Stoic formulation appears logically neater, in that it captures the 
symmetry of contradictoriness. It has, however, the less neat consequence that every negation 
 
77 ‘Der den widersprechenden Gedanken ausdrückende Satz wird mittels eines Verneinungswortes aus 
dem Ausdrucke des ursprünglichen Gedankens gebildet’ (N154). 




has two contradictories (see below).78 Once again, PRANTL’S—inaccurate—representation of 
the Stoics parallels Frege. Overinterpreting a passage in Simplicius (Simpl. in Cat. 403.32–
33; Prantl 449, n. 134), he claims that ‘[…] the Stoics teach expressly that exclusively only 
the affirmative and the negative [assertible] stand mutually in the relation of 
contradictoriness’ (Prantl 449).79 Frege expresses the symmetry more explicitly:  
 
[T]he only difference is that we have the opposite thought. So to each thought there 
corresponds an opposite. Here we have a symmetrical relation: If the first thought is the 
opposite of the second, then the second is the opposite of the first.80 (Logic PW 149)  
 
The Stoics would agree.  
 
CONTRADICTORIES 
STOIC contradictories (antikeimena, D.L. 
7.73; S.E. M. 8.89; Prantl 449 ‘das 




(‘widersprechende Gedanken’, N154). 
[The Stoics] say that contradictory 
[assertibles] are those in which the one 
surpasses the other by a negation/negator 
(S.E. M. 8.89; Prantl 449, n. 133). 
The thought that is contradictory to 
another thought seems composed of that 
[thought] and the negation [function] 
(N155, CP 386). 
The relation between contradictories is 
‘umkehrbar’/symmetric—follows from 
definition. 
The relation between contradictories is 
‘umkehrbar’/symmetric (Logik NS 161 = 
PWLB, PW 149). 
Stoics: For every affirmation there is 
precisely one contradictory. 
Prantl, reporting the Stoics incorrectly: For 
every axiōma there is precisely one 
contradictory (Prantl 449). 
 
 
For every thought there is a contradictory 
(Logik NS 161 = PWLB, PW 149). 
 
78 Not-p had both p and not-not-p as contradictories. See below on double negation. 
79 ‘[…] die Stoiker ausdrücklich lehren, dass ausschliesslich nur das bejahende und das verneinende 
Urtheil gegenseitig in diesem [i.e. contradictorischen] Verhältnisse stehen’ (Prantl 449). Simplicius 
says that ‘the Stoics believe that only the negations are contradictories to the affirmations’, which 
from an Aristotelian perspective suggests—to Simplicius and Prantl—that e.g. ‘Mieze is a non-horse’ 
is not the contradictory to ‘Mieze is a horse’. Alex. An. Pr. 402 and Apul. Herm. 191.6–11 suggest 
that the Stoic distinction was between a negation, which does not presuppose the existence of the 
referent of the subject expression, and an affirmation of the form ‘a is not F’, which presupposes the 
existence of the referent. Nothing follows about the question whether negations can have negations as 
contradictories.  
80 ‘nur der Gedanke ist der entgegengesetzte. So gibt es zu jedem Gedanken einen entgegengesetzten. 
Wir haben hier eine umkehrbare Beziehung: Wenn der erste Gedanke dem zweiten entgegengesetzt 
ist, so ist auch der zweite dem ersten entgegengesetzt’ (Logik NS 161). 




Two assertibles are contradictories with 
respect to truth and falsehood when one is 
the negation (apophatikon) of the other 
(D.L. 7.73; Prantl 449, n. 133). 
For every thought there is a contradictory 
thought so that a thought is declared false 
by the acknowledgement of its contrary 
as true (N154, CP 385). 
 
 
III.1.3.1.3. Double negation 
Double negation was anything but intuitive in antiquity, as well as at Prantl’s and Frege’s 
time, as is exemplified by both Lucian’s and Prantl’s ridiculing of Stoic double negation 
(Lucian, Gallus 11; FDS 930; Prantl 444, ‘a truly insurmountable nonsense’) and in Frege’s 
long paragraph in which he desperately searches for metaphors (N157, CP 388–89).  
 Both the Stoic and the Fregean definition of negation allow the formation of a 
negation by ‘prefixing’ a negator (negation part, negation functor) to a negation. Both spell 
this option out explicitly.  
 THE STOICS have a special term for the negation of a negation, the übernegation 
(huperapophatikon) (D.L. 7.69; Prantl 444, n. 120). They define it as ‘the negation of a 
negation’ (ibid.) and say that it is a kind of negation. The übernegation is thus itself a 
negation, and by implication an assertible. Semantically, we learn by example that the 
assertible ‘“not: not: it is day” posits [the assertible] “it is day”’ (D.L. 7.69, following 
emendation; Prantl 444, n. 120; Lucian, Gallus).81 Prantl writes: ‘in which two negations 
cancel each other out and bring about an affirmation’ (‘in welchem zwei Negationen sich 
aufheben und eine Affirmation bewirken’, Prantl 444). Thus, by the Stoic definition of 
contradictories as well as by the Stoic truth conditions for negation (above), if an 
übernegation is true, the negation from which it was formed is false and vice versa.  
 FREGE introduces the double negation (‘doppelte Verneinung’) in his Negation, 
describing it as the negation of the negation (N156–57, CP 388–89). In CT he writes: ‘But 
since ‘not (not B)’ has the same sense as ‘B’ […] ’ (‘Da aber ‘nicht (nicht B)’ denselben Sinn 
hat wie ‘B’ […]’, CT44, CP 399). He states that of a negation and the negation of that 
negation, one and only one is true (N157, CP 389). Already in BS156 §18 we read, ‘Duplex 
negatio affirmat. The denial of denial is affirmation’ (emphasis omitted).82 ‘Duplex negatio 
affirmat’ can be found in logic texts of Frege’s era, and thus does not imply a Stoic impact. 
Rather, the relevant points here are Frege’s specific view and wording. Shortly after 
 
81 Confirmed by Lucian, Gallus 11: αἱ δύο ἀπόφασεις μίαν καταφάσιν ἀποτελοῦσιν.  
82 Begr44 §18: ‘duplex negatio affirmat. Die Verneinung der Verneinung ist Bejahung’ (emphasis 
omitted). 




introducing the symmetry of contradictories, Frege writes ‘We could declare it false by 
inserting a second “not” […] And from this it follows that two negatives cancel one another 
out’ (Logic PW 149, emphasis mine).83  
The combination of incorporeal assertoric content and their definitions of negation 
and contradictories leave both Frege and the Stoics facing the following awkwardness. On the 
one hand, it is a property of an assertoric content that it is a negation or that it is an 
affirmation, and a double negation is a negation of a negation, and hence itself a negation. If 
one adds to this the syntactic definitions of contradictories (above), including the symmetry 
relation of contradictories, it oddly results that affirmations have one contradictory, and 
negations have two. On the other hand, a double negation ¬¬A and the corresponding 
affirmation A seem to be considered logically equivalent. So if the relation of 
contradictoriness is considered to hold between the equivalence classes that result from the 
duplex negatio affirmat, then each such class has one contradictory. But neither Frege nor the 
Stoics say this. (Frege’s treatment of double negation is also in tension with his claim that 
thoughts have ‘building blocks’ which somehow mirror the words that compose the sentences 






FREGEAN double negation (‘doppelte 
Verneinung’). 
An übernegation is the negation of a 
negation (D.L. 7.69; Prantl 444). It is a 
negation (ibid. entailed by context, eidos 
de toutou).  
 
Entailed by its definition and by context: 
an übernegation is an assertible (ibid.). 
One can call the negation of the negation 
of … double negation (N157, CP 388–
89). 
The negation of a thought … can serve as 
supplement of the negation [function] … . 
So I obtain the negation of the negation 
[of the thought] … which again, is a 
thought (N156, CP 387). 
 [The assertible] ‘not: not: it is day’ posits 
‘it is day’ (D.L. 7.69; Prantl 444, n.120). 
 
 ‘[I]n welchem zwei Negationen sich 
aufheben und eine Affirmation bewirken’ 
(Prantl 444). 
 
But since ‘not (not B)’ has the same sense 
as ‘B’, […] (CT44, CP 399).  
 





83 ‘Man könnte das Fürfalscherklären mit einem zweiten eingeschobenen “nicht” bewirken […] Und 
es ergibt sich so, dass die doppelte Verneinung sich aufhebt’ (Logik NS 161, emphasis mine). 




(Entailed by the truth-conditions of 
negation and by the semantic account of 
contradictories: either the negation or the 
negation of the negation is true.) 
Always one and only one is true … of the 
negation and the negation of the negation. 
(N157, CP 389). 
The double negation that dresses a 
thought does not change the truth-value of 
the thought (N157, CP 389). 
It appears that negations have two 
contradictories. 




III.1.3.1.4. Other negative assertoric contents  
Beyond negations (apophatikon), THE STOICS and Prantl each mention, one after the other, in 
the same sentence, two other kinds of negative assertibles. One is the eliminating assertible 
(arnētikon [axiōma]),84 defined as constituted from an eliminating part (morion) and a 
predicate, with ‘nobody walks’ as illustration (D.L. 7.70; Prantl 444). The other is a privative 
assertible (sterētikon), defined as constituted from a privative part (morion) and what is 
potentially an assertible, with ‘Unkind is this one’ as illustration. Prantl writes ‘that which 
negates seems solely to be classified according to the respective negative linguistic 
expression, […] or a universally negating word, e.g. “nobody” (arnētikon), or a word that is 
composed with the  privativum (sterētikon) […]’ (Prantl 444).85  
 In his PWLB, FREGE mentions analogues to precisely these two kinds of negative 
content, and like the Stoics and Prantl, in the same sentence and in the same order: ‘We have 
other signs for negation like “no”, and we often use the prefix “un” as, for example, in 
“unsatisfactory”’ (PWLP, PW 150).86 As the Stoics think that privative sentences express 
assertibles but do not think they express negations (entailed by the definitions D.L. 7.69–70), 
so Frege does not think that the sense (‘Sinn’) that is expressed by sentences with privatives, 
like ‘This man is unhappy’ are negations:87 we do have a thought, but it is not a negation.  
 
84 A common translation is ‘denying’, but this has the wrong connotations, since it can be seen as a 
force indicator, which it is not. LSJ has ἀρνητικός, ή, όν, denying, negative, μόριον ἀξιώματος 
Chrysipp. Stoic. 2.66, cf. Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 333.26; φαντασίαι Numen. ap. Eus. PE 14.8; 
ἐπίρρημα Eust. 211.37. Adv. ἀρνητικῶς Porph. in Cat.136.27, Simp. Phys. 812.17, Sch. Ar. Ra. 1455. 
None of those passages forces a translation of the word family of denial rather than negation.  
85 ‘[…] erscheint das verneinende bloss nach den jeweiligen negativen Sprach-Ausdrücken 
eingetheilt, […] oder ein allgemein verneinendes Wort, z.B. “Niemand” (arnētikon), oder ein mit dem 
 privativum zusammengesetztes Wort (sterētikon) […]’. 
86 ‘Wir haben für die Verneinung auch andere Zeichen wie “kein” und die Vorsatzsilbe “un” in 
manchen Fällen, wie z.B. in “ungenügend”’ (Logik NS 162). 
87 ‘For this reason the sentences “This man is not unhappy” and “This man is happy” do not have the 
same sense’ (Logic PW 150, emphasis mine, ‘Daher haben denn auch die Sätze “Dieses Haus ist nicht 





OTHER NEGATIVE ASSERTORIC CONTENTS 
THE STOICS have two further negative 
assertoric contents, mentioned (in the 
Summary D.L. 7.70 and in Prantl 444) in 
one sentence: first eliminating (i.e. 
universal negative) contents, second 
privative contents. 
FREGE mentions two further negative 
assertoric contents in one sentence, first 
(universal negative) contents, second 
privative contents. 
These are complete contents and 
assertibles (implied by context in D.L. and 
Prantl).  
These are thoughts (Logik NS 162, PW 
150). 
Stoic eliminating assertibles (arnētikon 
[axiōma]) are defined as constituted from 
an eliminating part and a predicate (D.L. 
7.70). The eliminating part is oudeis 
(nobody, no-), i.e. universal. 
Prantl 444: ‘allgemein verneinendes 
Wort’. 
Frege: ‘We have other signs for negation 
like “no” […]’ (PWLP, PW 150).  
Privative assertibles (sterētikon) are 
defined as constituted from a privative 
part and what is potentially an assertible. 
As an example we get ‘Unkind is this one’ 
(D.L. 7.70). Context implies that these are 
not negations.  
‘[…] the prefix “un” as, for example, in 
“unsatisfactory”’ (PWLP, PW 150). 
Implied: ‘This man is unhappy’ is not a 




III.1.3.2. Assertoric contents with binary connectives (compound propositions) 
Partly for its entertainment value, partly because it shows what Aristotelian prejudice Frege 
would have encountered as the norm, here is a quote from Prantl ranting about the semantics 
of the Stoic non-simple assertibles:  
 
This unscientific and inane treatment emerges even more clearly where for the ‘non-
simple’ judgments, too, principles are established for what is true and what is false; 
and there could hardly be anything that has come about in the field of humanities or 
human thought in general, that could even approximate in worthlessness and arrogant 
 
unschön”, “Dieses Haus ist schön” nicht denselben Sinn’, Logik NS 162, emphasis mine; the 
translator changed the example since ‘unbeautiful’ is rare in English.). By contrast, for Frege, ‘This 
man is not not happy’ and ‘This man is happy’ would have the same sense.  




twaddle this Stoic drivel about the conditional, disjunctive, causal and similar 
judgements.88 (Prantl 453) 
 
Now to the comparison with Frege: I start with some similarity factors that cut across 
different kinds of molecular propositions.  
 
(i) THE DEFINITIONS:  
STOIC non-simple assertibles are assertibles which consist of two or more assertibles or of the 
same assertible taken twice (or more often) (D.L. 7.68; Prantl 445). Stoic examples of non-
simple assertibles of the latter kind are ‘if it is day, it is day’ (S.E. M. 8.95; Prantl 445) and ‘if 
A then A’ (‘wenn A, dann A’) in Prantl (Prantl 456). FREGE, in his ‘Compound thoughts’ 
(‘Gedankengefüge’, CT), systematically introduces different kinds of compositions-of-
thoughts (thought compounds), or as the title is usually translated, of compound thoughts. He 
makes the same sort of distinction as the Stoics. Compound thoughts are thoughts in which 
two or more thoughts are composed into one—new—thought, or in which one thought is 
compounded with itself (CT37, CP 390: two; CT50–51, CP 406: more than two; CT 49–50, 
CP 404–05: one with itself). In EidL PW 188 (NS 204) Frege chooses a careful formulation 
that allows for the thoughts in a compound thought to be identical: ‘each of which expresses a 
thought’ (‘von denen jeder einen Gedanken ausdrückt’). Frege’s examples for the latter 
include ‘A or A’, [(not A) and A]. (Frege CT37, CP 391: any compound thought is itself a 
thought. CT49–50, CP 404–05: ‘cases where a thought is compounded with itself rather than 
with some different thought […] ‘A or A’ […] ‘(not A) and A’’.89 (He also has if A, A, see 
below.) This kind of connection of a proposition with itself is not common in the Aristotelian 
traditions in which the Stoics and Frege find themselves: Alexander of Aphrodisias ridicules 
it; Frege feels the need to justify it (CT50, CP 405).) 
 
(ii) THE DEFINITIONS ARE ITERATIVE:  
 
88 ‘Noch stärker nun tritt diese unwissenschaftliche und verstandlose Behandlungsweise da hervor, wo 
auch für die “nicht einfachen” Urtheile Grundsätze aufgestellt werden, was wahr und was falsch sei; 
und es dürfte wohl kaum je irgend im Gebiete der Litteratur oder der menschlichen Geistesthätigkeit 
überhaupt Etwas aufgetreten sein, was an Nichtswürdigkeit und arrogantem Blödsinne diesem 
stoischen Geschwätze über die hypothetischen, disjunctiven, causalen und dergleichen Urtheile auch 
nur gleichkäme’.  
89 ‘Fälle […] in denen nicht verschiedene Gedanken, sondern ein Gedanke mit sich selbst gefügt ist 
[…] “A oder A” […] “[(nicht A) und A]”’ (CT49–50, LU 88). 




All STOIC non-simple definitions are defined in such a way that their components can 
themselves be simple or non-simple or mixed (i.e. one is simple, the other non-simple) (see 
definitions below). This fact is stated explicitly (S.E. M. 8.124). Prantl’s example is ‘When 
the first is and also the second, the third is’ (‘Wenn das Erste und zugleich das Zweite ist, ist 
das Dritte’, Prantl 480, with n. 190, S.E. M. 8.234–36). FREGE also provides an explicit 
informal iterative account: every composite thought (thought compound) is a thought and can 
be used in further composite thoughts (thought compounds), e.g. ‘(A and B) and C’ (CT50, 
CP 405–06), not [not A and [B and C]] (CT51, CP 406). So, BOTH the Stoics and Frege 
choose accounts that permit molecular propositions as elements of molecular propositions, 
and put no limit on the complexity and length of propositions (e.g. S.E. M. 8.124), and both 
provide examples. Frege (in CT51, CP 406) uses the same form of example that we find for 
the Stoics in Prantl (Prantl 480): ‘if [A and B] then C’.  
 
(iii) KINDS OF NON-SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS: 
The exact number of kinds of non-simple assertibles likely varied among the Stoics. Among a 
few others, they discuss conjunction, exclusive and inclusive disjunction, the material 
conditional and a stronger conditional, and a causal proposition, but no biconditional (D.L. 
7.71–74 Prantl 447–48, ns 125–128, 461, n. 160). Prantl lists conditional (‘hypothetisch’), 
copulative, disjunctive, causal, and comparing judgements (Prantl 462). Frege, too, discusses 
or mentions conjunction, exclusive and inclusive disjunction, the material conditional, and a 
causal proposition, but no biconditional.90  
 
(iv) CONNECTIVES AT THE LEVEL OF CONTENT  
As in the case of the negator, in both Stoic logic and that of Frege there is a tension with 
regard to the connectives. Are logical binary connectives linguistic items or are they 
something at the level of thought that is expressed by corresponding linguistic items? For 
both Frege and the Stoics, there is evidence for the second option. FREGE says that there is 
something in the realm of sense that corresponds to the (linguistic) ‘and’ and which is doubly 
unsaturated (‘und was dem “und” im Gebiete des Sinnes entspricht, muss zwiefach 
ungesättigt sein’ CT39, CP 393). The term he uses is ‘the compounding’ (‘das Fügende’), 
CT40, 41, 42, 43 (as in ‘compound thought’, ‘Gedankengefüge’). The Stoics say throughout 
 
90 Russell, for instance has a biconditional (Russell 1908: 245; cf. Russell and Whitehead 1910: 120, 
definition *4.01).  




that the connectives (sundesmoi, Prantl 445: ‘Conjunctionen’) connect axiōmata (D.L. 7.71–
74; S.E. M. 8.95; Prantl 445, n. 122). Where the Summary lists parts of speech (merē logou), 
sundesmos is also defined as a part of speech that connects parts of speech (D.L. 7.58); this is 
attributed to Diogenes of Babylon and probably comes from his work on (spoken) language 
that had been mentioned just before.  
 
(v) TERMINOLOGY 
For the component assertibles of a non-simple assertible, the Stoics use ‘the first’, ‘the 
second’, ‘the third’ (etc.) or ‘A’’, ‘B’’, ‘Г’’ (etc.), which are the Greek ordinal numerals. In 
CT passim (and in EidL, NS 202 = PW 186), Frege uses ‘the first’ (or ‘the first thought’), 
‘the second’, ‘the third’ (etc.), and schematically ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ (etc.). The use of ‘the first’, 
‘the second’ seems to be absent in his earlier works. 
 
 COMPOSITE ASSERTORIC CONTENT (COMPOSITE PROPOSITIONS) 
STOIC non-simple assertibles (ouch hapla 
axiōmata). 
FREGEAN compound thoughts (literally 
thought compound, Gedankengefüge). 
Non-simple assertibles are those which 
consist of two (or more) assertibles or of 
the same assertible taken twice (or more 
times) (D.L. 7.68). 
Compound thoughts are those where two 
(CT37, CP 390) [or more (CT51, CP 
406)] thoughts [or the same thought taken 
twice (CT50, CP 404–05)] are composed 
into one [new] thought.  
Can be combined from simple, non-
simple, or mixed (i.e. one simple one 
non-simple) assertible (S.E. M. 8.124; cf. 
Prantl 480, n. 190). 
‘In this way compound thoughts 
containing three thoughts can originate. 
[…] So too it will be possible to find 
examples of compound thoughts 
containing four, five, or more thoughts’ 
(CT51, CP 406).91 
Non-simple assertibles include 
conjunction, inclusive and exclusive 
disjunction, conditional (D.L. 7.71–74). 
Compound thoughts include conjunction, 
inclusive and exclusive disjunction, 
conditional (CT passim). 
Also discussed: causal conditionals (D.L. 
7.71, 74; Prantl 447, 457). 
Also discussed: causal conditional (SB48, 
CP 175). 
As schematic letters for component 
assertibles, the Stoics and Prantl use ‘the 
first’, ‘the second’, ‘the third’, or ‘A’, 
‘B’, ‘C’ (D.L. 7.80–81; Prantl 471-74 
with notes). 
Frege in CT uses ‘the first [thought]’, ‘the 
second [thought]’ and ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ for 
component thoughts (CT passim). 
 
91 ‘So können Gedankengefüge entstehen, die drei Gedanken enthalten […] So wird man auch 
Beispiele von Gedankengefügen finden können, die vier, fünf oder mehr Gedanken enthalten’ (CT51, 
LU 90). 




The same assertible can be taken twice. 
(D.L. 7.68) Example: if A, then A (‘wenn 
A, dann A’, Prantl 456). 
The same thought can be taken twice 
(CT50, CP 404–05). Example, among 
others: if A, then A (‘wenn A, so A’, 
CT50, CP 404–05). 
Prantl’s example from Sextus of a 
combination of a simple and a non-simple 
assertible:  
If the first and the second, then also the 
third (Prantl 480, S.E. M. 8.23–25). 
Frege’s examples of a combination of 
simple and compound thoughts:  
if [B and C] then A,  
not [not A and [B and C]] (CT51, CP 
406). 
Connectives are variably said to connect 
propositions (D.L. 7.71–72; S.E. M. 8.95) 
and (in a work on language by Diogenes 
of Babylon) to connect parts of speech, 
D.L. 7.58). 
 
The Stoic term is ‘those which connect’ 
(sundesmoi). 
Connective expressions have analogues at 
the level of thought, which, like 
predicates, are unsaturated, but doubly so 
(CT37, 39, CP 391, 393). 
 
Frege’s term is ‘the compounding’, ‘das 




III.1.3.2.1. Conjunction  
STOIC conjunctive assertibles (sumpeplegmena) are syntactically defined as non-simple 
assertibles that are constructed by conjunctive connectives. An example is ‘both it is day and 
it is light’ (D.L. 7.72).92 From the definition of non-simple assertibles we know that the 
connectives conjoin two axiōmata. (Prantl 447 writes ‘The copulative judgment, to 
sumpeplegmenon, is the one brought about by ‘and’ or ‘both—and’ (kai, kai—kai)’.)93 The 
thus connected assertibles are called ‘those [axiōmata] in the conjunction’ (e.g. S.E. PH 2.58, 
Galen, Inst. Log. 6.6). The truth-conditions are truth-functional. A conjunction is true when 
all its conjuncts are true, and otherwise false (S.E. M. 8.125; Prantl 459, n. 155). (Prantl 459, 
‘In fact, as regards the copulative judgment, the sumpeplegmenon, it has come down to us 
that it was true (hugies) if all the components connected by ‘both’ or ‘both—and’ correspond 
to the truth, but false if only one among them is false’.)94 Some sources have been interpreted 
as suggesting that conjunctions could have more than two conjuncts but all reliable Stoic 
 
92 συμπεπλεγμένον δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπό τινων συμπλεκτικῶν συνδέσμων συμπέπλεκται, οἷον ‘καὶ 
ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ φῶς ἐστι’ (D.L. 7.72). 
93 ‘Das copulative Urtheil, to sumpeplegmenon, ist das durch “Und” oder “Sowohl—als auch” (kai, 
kai—kai) bewirkte’. 
94 ‘Und zwar ist uns in Betreff des copulativen Urtheiles, des sumpeplegmenon, überliefert, dass 
dasselbe als richtig (hugies) galt, wenn sämmtliche durch “sowohl-als auch” verbundenen Glieder 
desselben der Wahrheit entsprechen, als falsch aber, wenn auch nur Eines unter jenen falsch ist’. 




sources can be read as suggesting that Stoic conjunctions had precisely two conjuncts (so also 
Prantl 447).95 Of these, one, of course, could be non-simple (S.E. M. 8.124) and so itself a 
conjunction. FREGE, in his Einleitung in die Logik, writes this about his conjunction 
(‘Kondukt, Verein’):  
 
If a whole is composed of two sentences connected by ‘and’, each of which expresses 
a thought, then the sense of the whole is also to be construed as a thought, for this 
sense is either true or false; it is true if each component thought is true, and false in 
every other case—hence when at least one of the two component thoughts is false. 96 
If we call the thought of the whole the conjunction of the two component thoughts, 
[…]97 (EidL, PW 188) 
 
A conjunction thus contains several thoughts (itself and component conjunct(s)) and is truth-
functional. Elsewhere Frege emphasizes that the conjoining word (‘Bindewort’)98 ‘and’ 
combines whole sentences that express thoughts (CT74, CP 392) and that what corresponds 
to the word ‘and’ in the realm of sense is doubly unsaturated.99  
 Both in ancient Greek and in German (as in English) the conjunctive connective can 
combine what is expressed by noun phrases or by predicate phrases, and in Aristotle and 
Peripatetic texts we find it used in that way in the context of logic. Both the Stoics and Frege 
choose the use that combines complete contents.  
The early Stoics appear to have regimented the use of the conjunctive connective so 
that either sentence that expresses a component assertible has ‘and’ prefixed to it (kai […] kai 
---). This, together with similar choices for the other non-simple assertibles, gave the Stoics 
 
95 That the early Stoics had only conjunctions with two conjuncts is confirmed also by S.E. M. 8.124, 
and by the fact that their syllogistic did not require conjunctions with more than two conjuncts, and 
that Plutarch’s riddle can be solved more easily on this assumption (Bobzien 2019; Bobzien 2011). 
96 This sentence is very close to Prantl 459. 
97 ‘Wenn ein Ganzes aus zwei durch ‘und’ verbundenen Sätzen besteht, von denen jeder einen 
Gedanken ausdrückt, so ist auch der Sinn des Ganzen als ein Gedanke aufzufassen, denn dieser Sinn 
ist entweder wahr oder falsch; wahr nämlich, wenn jeder der beiden Teil-Gedanken wahr ist, falsch in 
jedem anderen Falle -, also wenn mindestens einer der beiden Teilgedanken falsch ist. Nennen wir 
diesen Gedanken des Ganzen das Kondukt von den beiden Teilgedanken […]’ (EidL NS 204–05). 
98 ‘Bindewort’ in Borheck 1807: 304–05, translating sundesmos for all Stoic non-simple assertibles in 
the Summary. Prantl has ‘Conjunction’. Both are standard grammatical terms. 
99 ‘[…] “und”. Dieses Wort wird hier in besonderer Weise gebraucht. Es kommt hier nur in Betracht 
als Bindewort zwischen eigentlichen Sätzen. Eigentlich nenne ich einen Satz welcher einen Gedanken 
ausdrückt’ (CT74, CP 392); ‘und was dem “und” im Gebiete des Sinnes entspricht, muss zwiefach 
ungesättigt sein’ (CT75, CP 393). 




the means for a simple bracketing system similar to Polish notation. It appears that Prantl did 
not pick up on this point. Since this use is grammatical but not that frequent in ancient Greek, 
we can assume that the first ‘and’ (kai) was dropped by those not aware of the logical 
function of the first ‘and’. Frege does suggest such a use of ‘und’ (or ‘sowohl, als auch’), but 
uses brackets in CT passim.  
 
CONJUNCTION 
STOIC conjunction or conjunctive 
assertible (to sumpeplegmenon). 
FREGEAN conjunction (Kondukt, EidL, NS 
204 = PW 188.) 
A conjunction connects assertibles, which 
are called ‘those in a conjunction’. (There 
is no term for conjuncts.) 
In a Kondukt, thoughts, called part-
thoughts, are connected. (EidL, NS 204 = 
PW 188. There is no term for conjuncts.) 
The conjuncts are conjoined by 
conjunctive connectives (sumpeplegmena 
sundesma) ‘and’ or ‘both—and’ (kai, 
kai—kai) (Prantl 447, S.E. M. 8.124, D.L. 
7.72). 
The part-thoughts are connected with that 
which corresponds to the word ‘and’ 
(EidL, NS 204–05 = PW 188, CT74–75, 
CP 392–93).  
The connective ‘and’ (kai) connects 
assertibles, and that is, connects what is 
expressed by whole assertoric sentences. 
The connective ‘and’ (‘und’) combines 
whole sentences that express thoughts 
(CT74, CP 392). 
Truth-conditions: a conjunction is true 
when all its conjuncts are true, otherwise 
false, i.e. when at least one of those 
[conjuncts] is false (S.E. M. 8.125; Prantl 
459). 
Truth-conditions: a ‘Kondukt’ is true 
when both its part-thoughts are true, in 
any other case false, i.e. when at least one 
of the two part-thoughts is false (EidL, NS 
204, PW 188). 
Some formulations imply that the 
connectives (sundesma) are not linguistic 
items, but are at the level of assertibles. 
There exists something in the realm of 
sense that corresponds to the word ‘and’. 
It is doubly unsaturated (e.g. CT75, CP 
393). 
The early Stoic canonical view appears to 
restrict the conjuncts in a conjunction to 
two (D.L. 7.72; Prantl 447, n. 127). 





Both the Stoics and Frege distinguish between inclusive and exclusive disjunction. The STOIC 
primary disjunction, the diezeugmenon, is exclusive (D.L. 7.72; Galen, Inst. Log. 3.3; Prantl 
447–48, 460). It is formed with the disjunctive connectives (D.L. 7.72) ‘either […] or […]’. 
These connectives indicate that one of the component assertibles is false (S.E. PH 2.191, 




Prantl 460).100 Prantl writes: ‘[…] is effected by the conjunction ‘or’ or ‘either—or’, and the 
inner sense of this composition is the relation of a mutual exclusion’ (447–48, emphasis 
mine) and ‘a disjunctive judgment is true, if between the two disjunctive constituents a 
complete opposite obtains that effects mutual elimination’ (Prantl 460 with Prantl’s reference 
to Prantl page 604, in particular to what Prantl says about Galen Inst. Log. on that page, i.e. 
on page 604; cf. also Gellius 5.11.8).101 Stoic exclusive disjunction is non-truth-functional. 
However, the way in which Prantl presents it, this can easily escape notice. The inclusive 
disjunction (paradiezeugmenon) plays no role in early Stoic syllogistic. Its truth conditions 
are truth-functional. They require only that not all disjuncts are true (Prantl 521–22, 604; 
Gellius 16.8.14). There is not enough evidence to determine what the—regimented—syntax 
of Stoic inclusive disjunction was. 
 FREGE explains the truth-functional inclusive and exclusive ‘or’ in his Begriffsschrift. 
He writes,  
 
Now the words ‘or’ and ‘either—or’ are used in two ways […] Of the two uses for the 
expression ‘A or B’, the first, in which the coexistence of A and B is not excluded, is 
the more important; and we shall use the word ‘or’ with this meaning. Perhaps it is 
appropriate to make this distinction between ‘or’ and ‘either—or’ that only the latter 
shall have the secondary meaning of mutual exclusion.102  
(Begr 11§7 = BS 121–22, emphasis mine)  
 
Frege’s use of ‘the non-exclusive “oder”’ (‘das nicht ausschliessende “oder”’, CT42, CP 396) 
suggests that the distinction was still relevant in the 1920s and the exclusive ‘or’ still the 
norm. The suggestion of using a two-part connective for the exclusive disjunction matches 
the Stoics. 
 
100 The word rendered ‘indicate’, literally ‘announces’ (ἐπαγγέλλεται), is commonly used by the 
Stoics to express the semantics of an expression. 
101 ‘[…] ist durch die Conjunction ‘oder’ oder ‘entweder-oder’ […] bedingt, und der innere Sinn 
dieser Zusammensetzung ist das Verhältnis einer wechselseitigen Ausschliessung’ (447–48); ‘ein 
disjunctives Urtheil sei wahr, wenn zwischen den in ihm disjungirten Gliedern ein vollständiger, 
gegenseitige Vernichtung bewirkender Gegensatz […] bestehe’ (460, emphasis mine).  
102 ‘Die Wörter “oder” und “entweder—oder” werden nun in zweifacher Weise gebraucht […] Von 
den beiden Gebrauchsweisen des Ausdruckes “A oder B” ist die erstere, bei der das 
Zusammenbestehen von A und B nicht ausgeschlossen ist, die wichtigere, und wir werden das Wort 
“oder” in dieser Bedeutung gebrauchen. Vielleicht ist es angemessen zwischen “oder” und 
“entweder—oder” den Unterschied zu machen, dass nur das Letztere die Nebenbedeutung des sich 
gegenseitig Ausschliessens hat’ (BS 11 §7, emphasis mine). 






STOICS distinguish exclusive and 
inclusive disjunction (to diezeugmenon, to 
paradiezeugmenon, D.L. 7.72; Gellius 
16.8.11–14; Prantl 447–48 and 521, n. 
21). 
FREGE distinguishes exclusive and 
inclusive disjunction (Begr 11 §7 = BS 
121–22). 
 
The disjunctions are formed with the 
disjunctive connective ‘either […] or’ or 
‘or’ (D.L. 7.72, Gellius 5.11.8, Gal. Inst. 
Log. 3.3, Prantl 448). 
The ‘or’ and ‘either […] or’ are used for 
inclusive and exclusive disjunction. Frege 
recommends language regimentation 
(Begr 11 = BS 121–22). 
The inclusive ‘or’ is truth-functional.  The inclusive ‘or’ is truth-functional (also 
CT42, CP 396). 
The exclusive disjunction requires mutual 
exclusion (mache) of the disjuncts, and 
one disjunct being false (S.E. PH 2.191, 
Prantl 460). 
Prantl’s presentation: ‘mutual exclusion’ 
(‘Wechselseitige Ausschliessung’, Prantl 
447–48) compatible with truth-functional 
reading.  




Mutual exclusion (‘[Das] sich 
gegenseitige Ausschliessen’, Begr 11). 
Exclusive disjunction is primary and 
more important. 
Inclusive disjunction is primary and more 
important. 
 
Here we have another case in which Prantl’s presentation of Stoic logic is closer to Frege 
than to Stoic logic itself. However, Frege’s disjunction need not have been impacted by the 
Stoic one via Prantl. The distinction between inclusive and exclusive disjunctions was a 
commonplace at Frege’s time. However, again, we often find the Peripatetic syntax that (does 
not have the ‘either’ and) combines the predicates rather than entire sentences (Mill, Sigwart, 
Ulrici, etc.). So disjunction is added here only because we cannot rule out the possibility that 
Frege was inspired by the Stoics here as well. 
 
 
III.1.3.2.3. Conditional  
It is generally known that Fregeo-Russellian classical logic includes virtually the same truth-
functional definition for the material conditional as that which Philo and some Stoics adopted 
for their assertibles, and the Stoic discussion of conditionals and their truth-conditions has 
been connected with Frege’s logic in the past.103 My focus will be on parallels between Frege 
 
103 Łukasiewicz 1935: 125, Mates 1962: 46–47, Kneale 1962: 531. 




and the Stoic view as presented in Prantl and the Summary. I juxtapose the most substantial 
similarites case by case. 
 
(i) THE DEFINITION AND SYNTAX OF CONDITIONALS: 
THE STOICS define the conditional assertible (to sunēmmenon) syntactically as a non-simple 
axiōma in which two axiōmata are connected with the connective ‘if’ (ei). The component 
axiōma after the ‘if’ is called antecedent (ēgoumenon) or ‘the first’; the other component 
axiōma is called the consequent (lēgon) or ‘the second’ (D.L. 7.71; S.E. M. 8.109ff; Prantl 
446-47). For ‘the first’ and ‘the second’ we also find ‘A’, ‘B’ in some manuscripts.104 So 
each conditional consists of at least two assertibles, and at least three if the component 
assertibles differ.105 A conditional indicates a relation of consequence (akolouthia, D.L. 7.71, 
akolouthein; ‘Verhältniss einer Folge’, Prantl 447);106 that is, it indicates that the second 
(assertible) follows from the first. Standard examples are ‘if it is day, it is light’ and ‘if it is 
day, it is day’ (D.L. 7.71; S.E. M. 8.109ff; Prantl n. 125). 
 In the posthumous Einleitung in die Logik (EidL), FREGE calls conditionals 
‘hypothetische Gedanken’ (EidL, NS 205 = PW 188–89). In Compound Thoughts (CT45, CP 
400) he calls them ‘hypothetische Gedankengefüge’, announces that he will use the linguistic 
form ‘If B, then A’ (‘Wenn B, so A’), and says that its consequent (‘Folge’) is the sense (or 
thought content) of ‘A’, and its antecedent or condition (‘Bedingung’) the sense of ‘B’.107 In 
addition to the schematic ‘A’ and ‘B’, he also uses the metalinguistic ‘the first [thought]’ and 
‘the second [thought]’ to refer to these (ibid.). A little later (CT47, CP 402), he writes that ‘in 
a hypothetical compound thought we can distinguish three thoughts, namely the antecedent, 
the consequent, and the thought composed from the two’. In the Einleitung in die Logik, 
Frege distinguishes between hypothetical sentence, consequent sentence, and antecedent 
sentence, on the one hand, and hypothetical thought, consequent, and antecedent expressed 
 
104 ‘First’ and ‘second’ and ‘A’ and ‘B’ are used in inference schemata where reference to the 
(schematic) component assertibles has not yet been made with other letters. Some later texts have A, 
B, etc. for A, B, etc. 
105 Prantl 446–47: ‘Das hypothetische Urtheil […] ist jenes nicht einfache Urtheil, in welchem die 
Verknüpfung durch “Wenn” (ei) bewerkstelligt ist, mag hiebei Ein [sic] einfaches Urtheil zweimal 
oder zwei verschiedene einfache Urtheile gesetzt sein; der grammatische Vordersatz heisst 
hgoumenon, der grammatische Nachsatz lhgon’ (reference in n. 125 to D.L. 7.71, S.E. M. 8.109ff.). 
106 ‘[…] der innere Sinn dieser Verknüpfung ist das Verhältniss einer Folge, einer akolouthia’. 
107 ‘Statt “Gedankengefüge sechster Art” sage ich auch “hypothetisches Gedankengefüge” und nenne 
den ersten Gedanken “Folge”, den zweiten “Bedingung” im hypothetischen Gedankengefüge’ (CT45, 
CP 400). 




by these, on the other (EidL, NS 203, 205 = PW 187, 188–89).108 His use of ‘Bedingung’ and 
‘Folge’ corresponds to Prantl’s ‘Folgeverhältnis’ and to the Stoic akolouthia. Both Frege 
(EidL, NS 201 = PW 185) and Prantl (453) use ‘hypothetical judgement’ (‘hypothetisches 
Urtheil’). This was the common expression for conditionals at the time, and need not indicate 
any influence. Note also the terminological similarities for the component contents. In CT44–
45, CP 398–400 Frege uses throughout the expressions ‘the first thought’ and ‘the second 
(thought)’ for the two atomic thoughts in the composite thought. This corresponds to the 
Stoic use of ‘the first (i.e. axiōma)’ and ‘the second (i.e. axiōma)’. And where in Stoic 
sources we sometimes find ‘the first’ and sometimes alpha (‘A’) (where this is a way of 
saying the first), Frege says (CT43, CP 398) about the fifth kind of composite thought, 
‘Given that ‘A’ expresses the first thought and ‘B’ expresses the second’ (CT43, LU 80, 
‘Wenn ‘A’ den ersten Gedanken, ‘B’ den zweiten Gedanken ausdrückt’. Cf. also EidL, NS 
205 = PW 189, ‘erster Gedanke, zweiter Gedanke, hypothetischer Gedanke’).  
 
(ii) THE TRUTH CONDITIONS:  
The Stoic account of the conditional introduced by Philo, which Prantl discusses at length 
since he finds it most abhorrent, is analogous to the one that Frege considers to be correct but 
persistently misunderstood. Where PRANTL bemoans ‘the merely formal relationship of the 
combination of the True and the False’ (454, also 455, i.e. the truth-functionality), and ‘that it 
is two judgements that are put side by side’ (453), which leaves only the ‘Debris of the 
hypothetical judgment’ (ibid.),109 FREGE (in EidL, NS 201–03 = PW 185–87) emphasizes that 
 
108 ‘[…] können wir den hypothetischen Satz nennen, dessen Folgesatz der Ausdruck des ersten 
Gedankens, und dessen Bedingungssatz der Ausdruck des zweiten Gedankens ist’ (EidL NS 205, PW 
188, emphasis mine); ‘[…] den hypothetischen Gedanken […], dessen Folge der erste Gedanke, und 
dessen Bedingung der zweite Gedanke ist’ (EidL NS 205, PW 188, emphasis mine). 
‘[…] das Entgegengesetzte eines Kondukts von dem Entgegengesetzten eines ersten Gedankens und 
von einem zweiten Gedanken ist […] das was ich mit dem Bedingungsstriche ausdrücke. Der Satz des 
ersten Gedankens ist wieder der Folgesatz, der des zweiten der Bedingungssatz. Den ganzen Satz 
aber, der ausdrückt das Entgegengesetzte eines Kondukts von dem Entgegengesetzten eines ersten 
Gedankens und von einem zweiten Gedanken, können wir den hypothetischen Satz nennen, dessen 
Folgesatz der Ausdruck des ersten Gedankens, und dessen Bedingungssatz der Ausdruck des zweiten 
Gedankens ist’ (EidL NS 205, PW 188, emphasis mine).  
‘Kondukt von dem Entgegengesetzten des ersten Gedankens und von dem zweiten Gedanken […] 
Entgegengesetztes des Konduktes von dem Entgegengesetzten des ersten Gedankens und von dem 
zweiten Gedanken: […] Dies ist der hypothetische Gedanke, dessen Folge der erste Gedanke und 
dessen Bedingung der zweite Gedanke ist’ (EidL NS 205, PW 189, emphasis mine). 
109 ‘das bloss formale Verhältniss der Combination von Wahr und Falsch’ (Prantl 454); ‘dass eben 
“zwei” Urtheile es sind, welche nebeneinandergestellt werden’ (Prantl 453); ‘Trümmer des 
hypothetischen Urtheiles übrig’ (ibid.). 




two thoughts are connected in the hypothetical thought. Compare Frege’s EidL, PW 186–87: 
‘People probably feel the lack of an inner connection between the thoughts: we find it hard to 
accept that it is only the truth or falsity of the thoughts that is to be taken into account, that 
their content doesn’t really come into it all’.110 Prantl’s complaint that the Philonian-type 
conditional disregards the causal relation, genus and species relations, and the like (Prantl 
455) exemplifies the kind of criticism to which Frege responds in CT when stating that his 
(Philonian or material) conditional is a useful tool for logic (CT 45, 46). Here are the 
passages about the truth-conditions from Prantl and Frege. They speak for themselves.  
 
PRANTL writes:  
 
And thus first the merely formal relationship of the combination of the True and the 
False was explained, resulting in  
antecedent true, consequent true, e.g. ‘When it is day, the sun shines’ 
antecedent false, consequent false, e.g. ‘When the earth flies, the earth has    
wings’ 
antecedent false, consequent true, e.g. ‘When the earth flies, the earth exists’ 
antecedent true, consequent false, e.g. ‘When the earth exists, the earth flies’ 
        or    ‘When it is day, it is night’ 
of these four combinations, only the fourth was called incorrect (mochtēron), and it 
was in particular Philo (see above fn. 8) who maintained this view of the hypothetical 
judgment, and hence also defined the correct hypothetical judgment—to hugies 
sunēmmenon—as the one which does not transition from a true antecedent to a false 
consequent.111  
 
110 ‘Man vermisst wahrscheinlich eine innere Verbindung zwischen den Gedanken; es will nicht recht 
einleuchten, dass von dem Gedanken nur in Betracht kommen soll, ob er wahr oder falsch ist, gar 
nicht eigentlich der Gedankeninhalt selbst’ (EidL NS 202–03). 
111 ‘Und so wurde denn nun auch zunächst das bloss formale Verhältniss der Combination von Wahr 
und Falsch […] auseinandergesetzt, und es ergab sich:141) 
      Vordersatz  wahr,  Nachsatz  wahr,  z.b.  “Wenn es Tag ist, scheint die Sonne” 
 ″   falsch,  ″ falsch, ″  “Wenn die Erde fliegt, hat die Erde Flügel” 
 ″ falsch, ″ wahr,  ″  “Wenn die Erde fliegt, existirt die Erde”  
 ″ wahr, ″ falsch, ″  “Wenn die Erde existirt, fliegt die Erde” 
     oder  “Wenn es Tag ist, ist es Nacht”.111) 
Von diesen vier Combinationen nun wurde bloss die vierte als eine unrichtige (mochthēron) 
bezeichnet142), und zwar war es besonders Philo (s. oben Anm.8), welcher diese Auffassung des 




(Prantl 454, cf. S.E. PH 2.105; D.L. 7.81)  
 
This passage is essentially a free translation of S.E. PH 2.105, which is Prantl 454, n. 141. 
Prantl’s n. 142 has the continuation of the text—‘Of these only that with a true antecedent 
and a false consequent is false (incorrect), they say, but/and the others are true (sound)’—as 
well as the parallel in S.E. M. 8.449. N. 143 adds: ‘Philo says that correct is the conditional 
which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent’ (S.E. PH 2.110). 
 
FREGE, PW 186, writes: 
  
with two thoughts, only four cases are possible: 
1. the first is true and likewise the second. 
2. the first is true, the second false. 
3. the first is false, the second is true. 
4. both are false. 
Now, when the third of these cases does not obtain, then the connection which I have 
signified with the ‘Bedingungsstrich’ exists. The sentence that expresses the first 
thought is the consequent sentence; the sentence which expresses the second thought 
is the antecedent sentence.112  
(EidL, NS 202 = PW 186, my translation)  
 
In Begr 5 §5 (BS 115) we have the almost identical:  
 
If A and B stand for assertible contents […], there are the following four possibilities: 
(1) A is affirmed and B is affirmed; (2) A is affirmed and B is denied […] [The 
 
hypothetischen Urtheiles vertrat und daher auch das richtige hypothetische Urtheil—to hygies 
sunēmmenon—als dasjenige definirte, welches nicht von einem wahren Vordersatze zu einem 
falschen Nachsatze übergehe143)’ (Prantl 454). 
112 Frege EidL NS 202: ‘Wenn man zwei Gedanken hat, so sind nur vier Fälle möglich: 
 1. der erste ist wahr und desgleichen der zweite; 
 2. der erste ist wahr, der zweite falsch; 
 3. der erste ist falsch, der zweite ist wahr; 
 4. beide sind falsch. 
Wenn nun der dritte dieser Fälle nicht stattfindet, so besteht die Beziehung, die ich durch den 
Bedingungsstrich bezeichnet habe. Der Satz, der den ersten Gedanken ausdrückt, ist der Folgesatz; 
der Satz, der den zweiten Gedanken ausdrückt, ist der Bedingungssatz’. 




‘Bedingungsstrich’] stands for the judgment that the third of these possibilities does 
not occur, but one of the other three does.113 (emphasis omitted)  
 
Note the following differences which are in line with Frege’s later philosophy: in EidL (i) the 
antecedent gets first place, the consequent second place; (ii) Frege uses ‘der erste’, ‘der 
zweite’ for ‘B’, ‘A’, and ‘der erste (Gedanke), der zweite (Gedanke)’ throughout; 114 (iii) 
‘wahr’ and ‘falsch’ for ‘bejaht’ and ‘verneint’; and (iv) he adds the names for antecedent and 
consequent. All four changes have parallels in Prantl and the Stoics. In (CT, CP 399), finally, 
we find a sentence very similar to the one Prantl adds after the four truth-functional 
possibilities (Prantl 454), where Frege introduces the truth conditions for hypothetical 
composite thought: they are ‘[…] false if and only if the [consequent, ‘Folge’] is false, but the 
[antecedent, ‘Bedingung’] is true’.115  
 
(iii) THE INTERDEFINABILITY OF THE CONDITIONAL IN TERMS OF NEGATION AND 
CONJUNCTION: 
THE STOICS are aware of the interdefinability of the Philonian conditional in terms of 
negation and conjunction. Evidence shows that they rephrase the Philonian conditional as the 
negation of a conjunction with the antecedent as first conjunct and the negation of the 
consequent as second conjunct (Cic. Fat. 15–16). It is likely that they used this alternative 
formulation in order to retain both Chrysippus’ and Philo’s conditional in their logic. The 
Cicero passage suggests that if the Chrysippean conditional ‘if A, B’ is true then (AB) is 
true, but not vice versa (ibid.), and that in certain specific cases only the ‘Philonian 
conditional’ comes out true, and is hence appropriate to use.116 Interestingly, the Summary 
 
113 ‘Wenn A und B beurtheilbare Inhalte bedeuten, so giebt es folgende vier Möglichkeiten: 1) A wird 
bejaht und B wird bejaht; 2) A wird bejaht und B wird verneint; […] [Der Bedingungsstrich] bedeutet 
nun das Urtheil, dass die dritte dieser Möglichkeiten nicht stattfinde, sondern eine der drei andern’ 
(Begr 5 §5) . 
114CT 44, CP 399: Frege’s use of ‘der erste Gedanke’, ‘der zweite Gedanke’: ‘Daraus folgt, dass ein 
Gefüge sechster Art eines ersten Gedankens mit einem zweiten dann und nur dann falsch ist, wenn der 
erste Gedanke falsch, der zweite aber wahr ist. Ein solches Gedankengefüge ist also wahr, wenn der 
erste Gedanke wahr ist, einerlei, ob der zweite Gedanke wahr oder falsch ist. Ein solches 
Gedankengefüge ist auch wahr, wenn der zweite Gedanke falsch ist, einerlei, ob der erste Gedanke 
wahr oder falsch ist. […]’ (emphasis mine). 
115 ‘[…] dann und nur dann falsch ist, wenn der erste Gedanke falsch, der zweite aber wahr ist’. The 
text continues ‘[…] true when the consequent is true, and true when the antecedent is false, whether 
the consequent is true or false’ (CT44, CP 399). 
116 Cf. e.g. Bobzien 1998: 156–67. The passage of Cicero’s De Fato is not in Prantl (I believe), but 
several other passages of that work with substantial logical content are. So it would be evident for 




sports a version of the Sorites paradox in the form A1,(A1A2), (A2A3), […] (An-
1An), An (D.L. 7.82, Prantl 54, n. 94, referred to in ns 210, 213, 216).  
 Similarly, FREGE regards a hypothetical thought as interdefinable with a negation of a 
conjunction of the antecedent with the negation of the consequent. He treats ‘if B, then A’ 
and ‘not ((not A) and B)’ as two ways of expressing the same hypothetical thought (CT45, 
CP 400), after having just on the previous page said that ‘B and (not A)’ expresses the same 
thought as ‘(not A) and B’ (CT44, CP 399). He produces truth-conditions for the expression 
with negation and conjunction: a hypothetical thought-compound ‘not ((not A) and B)’ is 
false if and only if the first thought is false, but the second true; true when the first is true, 
whether the second is true or false; and true when the second thought is false, whether or not 
the first is true or false (CT44, CP 399).117 And eerily close to the Stoic and Prantl’s 
description of the Philonian conditional: the hypothetical connective of A and B is the 
contradictory of the conjunction of A and the contradictory of B (NS 216, Kurze Übersicht = 
PW 200).118  
 
(iv) CONDITIONALS OF THE FORM ‘IF A, A’: 
As an example of a non-simple assertible in which the same assertible is taken twice, THE 
STOICS offer ‘if it is day, it is day’ (e.g. D.L. 7.69; S.E. PH 2.112; Prantl 456, n. 148). Prantl 
implies that, for the Stoics, conditionals of the form ‘Si A est, A est’ are true (456).119 Prantl 
provides further Greek Stoic examples, including one case that adds that the conditional is 
 
someone reading Prantl that De Fato deals with various logical questions. Might Frege have read 
Cicero’s text as a result of studying Prantl? Without independent evidence, we have no compelling 
reason to assume he did. 
117 (CT45, CP 400) ‘Statt “Gedankengefüge sechster Art” sage ich auch “hypothetisches 
Gedankengefüge” und nenne den ersten Gedanken “Folge”, den zweiten “Bedingung” im 
hypothetischen Gedankengefüge [nicht ((nicht A) und B)]. Demnach ist ein hypothetisches 
Gedankengefüge wahr, wenn die Folge wahr ist. Auch ist ein hypothetisches Gedankengefüge wahr, 
wenn die Bedingung falsch ist, einerlei, ob die Folge wahr oder falsch ist. -- Wir können dafür auch 
schreiben “Wenn B, so A”’.  
118 NS 216 (Kurze Uebersicht): ‘Nun ist die hypothetische Verbindung von A und B das 
Entgegengesetzte des Vereins von A und vom Entgegengesetzten von B’. The terms are all Frege’s 
own, rather than coming from the logical tradition. The only difference to the Stoics description is 
that, instead of ‘negation of the conjunction of’, Frege has ‘the contradictory of the conjunction of’. 
(Cf. also ‘Den ganzen Satz aber, der ausdrückt das Entgegengesetzte eines Kondukts von dem 
Entgegengesetzten eines ersten Gedankens und von einem zweiten Gedanken, können wir den 
hypothetischen Satz nennen, dessen Folgesatz der Ausdruck des ersten Gedankens, und dessen 
Bedingungssatz der Ausdruck des zweiten Gedankens ist’ (EidL NS 205, PW 188).) 
119 Un-Stoically, perhaps inspired by the ‘is’ (estin) in ‘day is’ (ēmera estin), Prantl seems to use A as 
a term variable here, similar to above. 




true (447, n. 125). Generally, the Stoics consider all conditionals of the form ‘if A, A’ true 
(S.E. M. 8.281, 8.466; Prantl 447, n. 125). This is also remarked on by Prantl (461). In 
particular, Prantl argues that all such assertibles (diphoroumena) are analytically true, 
because they satisfy the Stoic criterion that a conditional is true if the contradictory of the 
consequent is in opposition to the antecedent.120  
FREGE states that a compound thought in which a thought A is compounded with 
itself and which is expressed by ‘if A, then A’ (‘wenn A, so A’) is true. As reason for the 
truth, he adduces that compound thoughts that are the contradictory/opposite/negation of 
these, i.e. those expressed by ‘[(not A) and A]’, are false, since of two thoughts of which one 
is the negation of the other, one is always false, and, hence, so is the compound thought 
(CT50–51, CP 405). This reason is closely related to that of Prantl just mentioned.  
  
CONDITIONAL ASSERTORIC CONTENTS 
STOICS: conditional assertible (sunēmmenon 
axiōma) (D.L. 7.71; S.E. M. 8.109; Prantl 
447). 
PRANTL: hypothetical judgement 
(hypothetisches Urtheil) (447, 453). 
FREGE: hypothetical thought (hypothetischer 
Gedanke) (EidL, NS 205 = PW 189), 
hypothetical thought compound 
(hypothetisches Gedankengefüge) (CT45, CP 
400). 
TERMINOLOGY: 
If …, --- (ei, eiper) (Prantl wenn and 
wenn/dann).  
Antecedent (ēgoumenon), consequent (lēgon) 
(Prantl, Vordersatz, Nachsatz). 
Relation of consequence (akolouthia, 
Verhältniss einer Folge, Folgeverhältnis, 
Prantl 447). 
TERMINOLOGY: 
If …, then --- (Wenn …, so ---). 
 
Antecedent (Bedingung), consequent (Folge).  
Relation of antecedent (Bedingung) and 
consequent (Folge) (CT45, CP 400, EidL, 
NS 205 = PW 188). 
TRUTH-FUNCTIONALITY 
 ‘the merely formal relation of the 
combination of true and false’ (das bloss 
formale Verhältniss der Combination von 
Wahr und Falsch) (Prantl 454, also 455).  
 
 
Not a causal relation (Prantl 455). 
TRUTH-FUNCTIONALITY 
‘that it is only the truth or falsity of the 
thoughts that is to be taken into account’ 
(EidL, PW 187) (EidL, NS 202–03, dass von 
dem Gedanken nur in Betracht kommen soll, 
ob er wahr oder falsch ist). 
 
Not a causal relation (Begr 5–6). 
Truth-functionality of the (Philonian) 
conditional axiōma (S.E. PH 2.105; Prantl 
454). 
Truth-functionality of the hypothetical 
thought (Begr 5–6; EidL, NS 202–03 = PW 
186–87; CT44, CP 399). 
 
120 ‘fällt theilweise dem Sprachlichen anheim, da es ja dann wahr ist, wenn das contradictorische (d.h. 
sprachliche) Gegentheil des Nachsatzes einen Gegensatz zum Vordersatze bildet’ (Prantl 461). 




List of four combinations: true/true, 
false/false, false/true, true/false (Prantl 454). 
The correct/true conditional is the one that 
does not have a true antecedent and a false 
consequent (S.E. PH 2.110; Prantl 454, n. 
143). 
List of four combinations: true/true, 
true/false, false/true, false/false (EidL, NS 
202 = PW 186; Begr 5–6; CT44 CP 399). 
‘false iff the consequent is false, but the 
antecedent is true’ (CT45, CP 399). 
Of these four combinations, only the fourth 
was called incorrect (mochtēron) (Prantl 
454). 
‘false if and only if the [consequent, Folge] is 
false, the [antecedent, Bedingung] false 
(CT44, CP 399). 
INTERDEFINABILITY 
The Philonian conditional axiōma can (and 
should) be rephrased as a negated 
conjunction with the antecedent and the 
negation of the consequent as conjuncts (Cic. 
Fat. 15–17, with D.L. 7.82 for example). 
INTERDEFINABILITY 
Frege considers the hypothetical thought 
compound expressible both in hypothetical 
form, and as the negation of a conjunction in 
which the antecedent and the negation of the 
consequent are the conjuncts (CT44–45, CP 
399–400); or the contradictory of a 
conjunction with the antecedent and 
contradictory of the consequent as conjuncts 
(Kurze Übersicht, NS 216 = PW 200). 
LOGICAL TRUTH OF ‘IF A, A’ 
Conditionals of the form ‘If A, A’ are said to 
be true (S.E. M. 8.281, 8.466; Prantl 456). 
They are analytically true, since the 
contradictory of the consequent is 
incompatible with the antecedent (Prantl 
461). 
LOGICAL TRUTH OF ‘IF A, A’ 
Conditionals of the form ‘If A, then A’ are 
said to be true (CT50–51, CP 405). 
Such a compound thought is (analytically) 
true, because the conjunctive thought that is 
its contradictory is always false, since it has a 
thought (the antecedent) and its negation (the 




III.1.3.2.4. Assertoric contents expressed by sentences with ‘because’ 
Finally, there is the unusual parsing of the content of sentences with ‘because’ clauses, or 
causal content.  
 Among their non-simple assertibles, THE STOICS list para-conditionals 
(parasunnēmena). These are assertibles that are para-connected121 by the because-connective 
and that have an assertible as antecedent and another as consequent. The example is ‘because 
it is day, it is light’. The truth-conditions are reductive. They combine the truth-conditions of 
the corresponding conditional with the truth of the first assertible in the para-conditional: 
‘The connective indicates that the second assertible follows from the first and that the first 
 
121 It is unclear how ‘para’ should be translated. There was also a para-disjunction, the inclusive truth-
functional disjunction (see above). This suggests that ‘para’ did not indicate a logical property, but 
rather a non-simple content of secondary importance (presumably for Stoic logic). 




holds’ (D.L. 7.71) (cf. Prantl 447; Simpl. in Cael., Prantl 386; ‘the older Peripatetics’; 
‘follows from’, akolouthein is the—generic—truth-condition for conditionals).122  
 
A para-conditional is true if its antecedent is true and the consequent follows from it, 
for example “if it is day, the sun is above the earth”. It is false when it either has a 
false antecedent or the consequent does not follow from it, for example “since it is 
night, Dio is walking” when said while it is day.  
(D.L. 7.74; cf. Prantl 457).  
 
The non-truth-functional (Chrysippean) truth-criterion for the Stoic conditional immediately 
precedes that for the para-conditional. This non-truth-functionality would thus likely have 
been inherited by the para-conditional.  
Compare this with what FREGE writes in Sense and Reference (SB):  
 
[In] the sentence ‘because ice is less dense than water, it floats on water’ we have [the 
thoughts]: 1. Ice is less dense than water; 2. If anything is less dense than water, it 
floats on water; 3. Ice floats on water. The third thought, however, need not be 
explicitly introduced, since it is contained in the remaining two.  
(SB48, CP 175)  
 
Frege adds that, as a result, the ‘because’-clause cannot be substituted salva veritate by one 
expressing a different content with the same truth-value (ibid.).  
 This is not exactly the same as the Stoic account, but the underlying principle seems 
to be. In both cases, we have the reduction of the content of a sentence with a causal clause to 
two sentences and, resulting from this, the truth-conditions of that content. First, in either 
case, the content of the ‘because’-sentence is constructed from three assertoric contents: a 
conditional and the antecedent and the consequent of the causal clause, and thus three 
assertoric contents from which the causal content is constructed. (In the Stoic case this is 
implied.) The key difference is that in his 2. Frege uses a—universal—conditional of the 
form ‘if something is F, it is G’. Second, in either case the content of the sentence is taken to 
 
122 D.L. 7.71: παρασυνημμένον μέν ἐστιν […] ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ ‘ἐπεί’ συνδέσμου παρασυνῆπται 
ἀρχόμενον ἀπ᾿ ἀξιώματος καὶ λῆγον εἰς ἀξίωμα, οἷον ‘ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν’. ἐπαγγέλλεται δ᾿ ὁ 
σύνδεσμος ἀκολουθεῖν τε τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑφεστάναι. As mentioned earlier, the 
word translated as ‘indicate’ is commonly used by the Stoics to express the semantics of an 
expression.  




be reducible to the conjunction of a related conditional and the antecedent of the causal 
clause. Third, since in both cases the relevant conditional is not truth-functional—if for 
different reasons—in neither case can we substitute the antecedent salva veritate, and the 
content of ‘because’-sentences is not truth-functional. Fourth, in each case, we can surmise, 
the motivation for the analysis of the ‘because’-sentences is to reduce the complex sentences 
to simpler elements of the author’s logical system, to make them logically treatable. 
 
CAUSAL ASSERTORIC CONTENTS 
STOIC para-conditional (parasunnēmenon) 
(D.L. 7.71, 73–74; Prantl 447). 
FREGEAN compound sentence with 
‘because’ (‘Satzgefüge mit “weil”’) 
(SB48, CP 175). 
Expression that identifies the kind of 
content: ‘because’ (epei) (D.L. 7.71; 
Prantl 447, n. 126). 
Expression that identifies the kind of 
content: ‘because’ (‘weil’) (SB48, CP 
175). 
Examples: ‘because it is day it is light’ 
(D.L. 7.71; Prantl 447, n. 126), ‘because it 
is day, the sun is above the earth’ (D.L. 
7.74; Prantl 457, n. 150). 
Example: ‘because ice is less dense than 
water, it floats on water’ (SB48, CP 175). 
Constructed from three assertibles: one 
related conditional and antecedent and 
consequent of the para-conditional (D.L. 
7.71; Prantl 447). The context, a 
classification of assertibles, entails that 
the conditional is an assertible. 
Contains three thoughts: one related 
conditional and the thoughts expressed by 
the antecedent and consequent sentences 
of the because-sentence ‘[In] the sentence 
“because ice is less dense than water, it 
floats on water” we have [the thoughts] 1. 
Ice is less dense than water; 2. If anything 
is less dense than water, it floats on water 
3. Ice floats on water’ (SB48, CP 175). 
The content is reducible to the 
(conjunction of) related conditional and 
antecedent of the para-conditional (D.L. 
7.71; Prantl 447). 
 
The content is reducible to (the 
conjunction of) the related conditional 
and the thought expressed by the 
antecedent of the because-sentence 
(SB48, CP 175). 
Since the related conditional is not truth-
functional, the because-sentence is not 
truth-functional (D.L. 7.73–74, implied). 
Since the related conditional is not truth-
functional, the because-sentence is not 
truth-functional (SB48, CP 175). 
 
The next section investigates how, considered comparatively, the Stoics and Frege dealt with 








III.1.4. First-order logic: universality and language regimentation 
FREGE: The last comparison concerns Frege’s posthumously published remarks on Logical 
Generality (LG),123 which may have been intended as a fourth part of his logical 
investigations. In this short piece, Frege moves from propositional logic to elements of first-
order logic. Here Frege provides another case in which we have ‘different expressions for the 
same […] thought’, this time three ways of expressing a universal thought. Here are his three 
sentences:124  
 
(6) All men are mortal.  
(7) Every man is mortal. 
(8) If something a man is, is it mortal.125 (German word-order retained.)  
 
(Note that Frege’s claim that (6) and (7) express the same thought as (8) does not reflect the 
logic of his time. In his The Principles of Mathematics (1903), Russell treats (6) and (8) as 
logically different. ‘All men’ is considered to have a special reference (cf. §59), whereas (8) 
is used as an example for his formal implication, which he discusses in ch. 3, and which 
appears to have nothing to do with the universal statement (6).) 
The syntactically infelicitous (8) is a literal rendering from the German. The relevance 
of the choice of literal translation becomes evident below. Frege advocates (8) over (6) and 
(7) as best suited to expressing universality: ‘In [(8)] we have the form of a conditional 
sentence and the indefinitely signifying sentence parts “something” and “it”. These contain 
the expression of universality’ (LA NS 280, LG, PW 259). They express only one thought 
(CT46–47, CP 402–03).  
 
123 Logische Allgemeinheit, LA, NS 278–81, written 1923 or later; English trans. Logical Generality, 
LG, PW 258–62. 
124 Frege’s double quotation marks indicate the linguistic expressions of thoughts.  
125 LA, NS 279 = LG, PW 259. The example ‘all men are mortal’ is a standard example in logic. For 
parallels cf. Frege’s ‘Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (NS 130), ‘“Alle gleichseitigen 
Dreiecke sind gleichwinklig” d.h.: “Wenn etwas gleichseitiges Dreieck ist, so ist es gleichwinkliges 
Dreieck” (sic)’. ‘ “All equilateral triangles are equiangular”, i.e. “If anything is an equilateral triangle, 
then it is an equiangular triangle” ’ (CSB, PW 119). Also CO197–98, CP 186-87: ‘“all mammals have 
red blood”, “what is mammal has red blood”, “if something is a mammal, then it has red blood” can 
all be said to say the same thing.’ Cf. also CT46–47, CP 402: ‘In dem Satzgefüge “Wenn jemand ein 
Mörder ist, so ist er ein Verbrecher” drückt weder der Bedingungssatz noch der Folgesatz für sich 
genommen einen Gedanken aus. […] weil das Wort “er” […] in dem aus dem Zusammenhange 
gelösten Satze ohne hinzukommnden Wink nichts bezeichnet […] Es ist sehr wesentlich, die beiden 
Fälle zu unterscheiden, die bei einem Satzgefüge von der Form “Wenn B, so A” vorkommen’. 
Einleitung NS 203–05 (PW 187–89), esp. 205 (PW 188–89) has another close parallel. 




 Frege adds that we can make a logical transition from this mode of expression to the 
particular (‘Besonderem’) by substituting the same proper name for the two indefinitely 
signifying sentence parts.126   
 
(9) If Napoleon a man is, is Napoleon mortal.127 (German word-order retained.) 
 
Frege then introduces the idea of a ‘Hilfssprache’ or ‘helping language’, which ‘is meant to 
serve as a bridge from the perceptible (i.e. language) to the imperceptible (i.e. thought)’. He 
applies this idea of a helping language to (9). Even after using ‘Napoleon’ instead of ‘he’ in 
(the consequent of) (9), (this repetition is thus part of the ‘Hilfssprache’)128 one still cannot 
read off that the sentence expresses a thought composed of the two thoughts ‘Napoleon is a 
man’ and ‘Napoleon is mortal’, and ‘in this deviation from what is language-related to what 
is thought-related, there is still a defect in the helping language’ (LA NS 281 = LG, PW 261). 
To remove this defect, he replaces (9) by  
 
(10) If Napoleon is a man, Napoleon is mortal.   (In German (10) is infelicitous.) 
 
THE STOICS129 maintained that the following two sentences each have a different linguistic 
expression but mean the same, since both cover all individual cases.  
 
(11) Man is a rational mortal living being. 
(12) If something is a man, it is a rational mortal living being.  
(S.E. M. 11.8–11, cf. Epictetus Diss. 2.20.2–3)130 
 
126 This produces a hypothetical compound thought (PW 261, ‘hypothetisches Gedankengefüge’, NS 
281). A hypothetical compound in which the same name occurs in the antecedent and consequent can 
be considered as a singular hypothetical thought (‘singuläre[r] hypothetische[r] Gedanke’), EidL NS 
205 = PW 188.  
127 LA NS 281 = PW 261; Also LA NS 280 = PW 260: ‘If a a human being is, is a mortal’ (German 
word-order retained). 
128 The repetition of the noun that has argument place in both sentences that express the component 
thoughts recurs in several Fregean passages (e.g. LM, NS 231 = PW 213–14: ‘Wenn Cato ein Mensch 
ist, so ist Cato sterblich’, derived from ‘Wenn etwas ein Mensch ist, ist es sterblich’). 
129 We can assume that this is Stoic since it makes a Stoic claim and uses Stoic terminology, and, 
more importantly, since later in the same passage Chrysippus’ view is represented as maintaining a 
relation like that between (11) and (12) but with a disjunctive sentence as the consequent sentence 
(S.E. M. 11.11). 
130 ‘for the one saying “Man is a mortal rational animal” says the same thing in meaning, though 
different in expression, as the one saying “if something is a man, it is a mortal rational animal”’ (ὁ 





(12) was said to be ‘universal’ (katholikon), since it encompasses all cases given in the 
antecedent. And since only conditionals with an indefinite pronoun and an anaphoric pronoun 
were called universal, one can infer that the universality was taken to be signified by these 
pronouns. This is confirmed by the fact that the Stoics named conditionals like (12) indefinite 
conditionals (Cic. Fat. 15).131 
 The Stoics indicated that from an indefinite conditional such as 
 
(13) If someone is born in the sign of the dogstar, then he won’t die at sea. 
 
a legitimate logical transition can be made to 
 
(14) If Fabius is born in the sign of the dogstar, then Fabius won’t die at sea.132 
 
(Cf. Prantl 456, ‘It is distinctly clear from a passage in Cicero that this conception of the 
hypothetical judgment, which agrees with the doctrine of the categorical judgment, ensued 
precisely from Chrysippus’.133 And in the footnote with the text passage: ‘For if what is 
connected as follows is true “If someone is born in the sign of the Dog Star, he will not die at 
sea”, then the following is also true “if Fabius is born in the sign of the Dog Star, Fabius will 
not die at sea”’.)  
 
γὰρ εἰπὼν ‘ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν’ τῷ εἰπόντι ‘εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖνο ζῷόν ἐστι 
λογικὸν θνητόν’ τῇ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει, τῇ δὲ φωνῇ διάφορον) (S.E. M. 11.8). The following 
sentence (S.E. M. 11.9) leaves no doubt that the singular noun ‘man’ without an article is understood 
universally, as covering every man (i.e. human being). For katholikon for an indefinite conditional, 
see S.E. M. 1.86; cf. Epictetus Diss. 2.20.2–3; Plutarch Comm. Not. 1080c. The equivalence between 
the universal ‘man’ and ‘all men’ should have been familiar to Frege. For example Bolzano states this 
in his 1837: (I) 250. 
131 For the Stoic treatment of logical generality, see Bobzien and Shogry, forthcoming. 
132 Cic. Fat. 15; Prantl 456, n. 147. At least part of the example is Roman, possibly provided by 
Cicero in order to illustrate Chrysippus’ view. But there can be no doubt that the Stoics accepted 
logical transitions of this kind. Cf. the sophism discussed by the Stoics: ‘If someone is in Athens, he is 
not in Megara. If (a) man is in Athens, (a) man is not in Megara (Prantl 492, n. 213). (The ‘a’ is in 
brackets, since Greek has no indefinite articule and ‘man’ is thus syntactically ambiguous). This 
argument is paradoxical only if the general scheme of inference is accepted as valid with proper 
names, demonstratives, or descriptions. Hence, in line with Fat. 15, we assume that the step from (13) 
to (14) was accepted as valid. 
133 ‘Dass aber diese mit der Lehre vom kategorischen Urtheile übereinstimmende Auffassung des 
Hypothetischen gerade von Chrysippus ausging, erhellt deutlich aus einer Stelle Ciceros’. 




Like Frege, the Stoics introduced a helping language, a language that was meant to 
build a bridge from the corporeal linguistic expressions to the incorporeal contents—and thus 
a language that reflects the structure of the assertibles and of content generally. We have 
dozens of cases as evidence that this is what the Stoics did.134 One relevant case here is that, 
in conditional sentences such as (14) which express instantiations of indefinite conditionals, 
the Stoics standardly used the same proper name both in the antecedent sentence and in the 
consequent sentence, although this is not standard Greek but, rather, atypical Greek.135 Note 
how Frege does the very same thing with Napoleon—and this is not standard in German 
either. Note also that in Greek you can put the words in a clause in almost any order, since the 
syntax is determined largely by case markings. Hence, the Stoics were generally able to 
choose formulations in which the antecedent and consequent sentences are each syntactically 
identical to the standard formulations for the atomic assertibles that are the component of the 
conditional. So we see that Frege has the same sentence in his helping language that the 
Stoics use in their regimented language—except that the German is ungrammatical, whereas 
the Greek is grammatical. (The German needs a little more help.) If the language does not 
suitably reflect content, the language needs adjusting.  
The more significant example of language regimentation is that from Frege’s (6) and 
(7) to (8); and from the Stoic (11) to (12): from the expression of universality in a simple 
sentence to the expression in an indefinite conditional. The formulation with an indefinite 
conditional is a natural language analogue to the formalization with a universal quantifier in 
symbolic logic, ‘For all x, if x is F, x is G’.136 Both the Stoics and Frege advocate this natural 
language sentence form to express universality against an Aristotelian tradition. The goal is 
likely the same both times: the form retains the assumed correspondence between linguistic 
expression and content, and thus reflects more accurately the structure of the imperceptible 
assertibles or thoughts. In particular, it reflects valid inference patterns that permit 
detachment and allows them to be performed semi-automatically.  
 
 
134 Cf. e.g. Atherton and Blank 2003: 314–16, and Barnes, Bobzien, and Mignucci 1999: 96–97; Frede 
1974. 
135 Cf. D.L. 7.77, 78, 80; S.E. M. 8. 246, 252, 254, 305, 308, 423; S.E. PH 2.105, 106, 141; Gellius 
16.8.9; Inst. Log. 4.1; Simp. Phys. 1300; Alex. An. Pr. 345; Cic. Fat. 12. In Prantl, e.g. 454, ‘die Erde 
[…] die Erde’ three times; 456, n. 147 ‘Fabio […] Fabio’; 466, n. 168: ‘Dion […] Dion’, and thus 
accessible to those familiar with Prantl. 
136 This does not mean that the Stoics and Frege unpacked these sentences in the same way. 
Quantifiers that range over variables were Frege’s, not Stoic. Cf. Bobzien and Shogry, forthcom. 









The following two sentences have different 
linguistic expression, but have the same 
meaning (S.E. M. 11.8–11). 
(11) Man is a rational mortal living 
           being.  
(12)     If something is a man, it is a rational  
          mortal living being.  
Three ‘different expressions for the same […] 
thought’ (LA NS 279, PW 259). 
 
(6) All men are mortal. 
(7) Every man is mortal. 
(8) If something a man is, is it mortal.  
 
(German word-order is retained in (8)). 
(12) and (13) were called indefinite 
conditionals. They contain an indefinite 
pronoun (‘something’) and an anaphoric 
pronoun (‘it’/‘he’/‘she’) (Cic. Fat. 15). 
 
They were said to be universal (katholikon). 
 
The Stoics generally used (12) instead of 
(11). 
In (8) we have the form of a conditional 
sentence and the indefinitely signifying 
sentence parts ‘something’ and ‘it’.  
 
 
These contain the expression of universality.  
 
(8) is the one we should use (LA NS 280, PW 
259–60). 
One can make a legitimate logical transition 
from indefinite conditionals like (12) and 
(13) to conditionals that are non-simple 
assertibles like (14) by substituting the same 
proper name for the indefinitely signifying 
sentence parts.  
 
(13) If someone is born in the sign of the 
      dogstar, then he won’t die at sea. 
(14) If Fabius is born in the sign of the 
     dogstar, then Fabius won’t die at sea.  
     (Cic. Fat. 15) 
One can make a legitimate transition from the 
mode of expression (8) to the particular, by 
substituting the same proper name for the 
indefinitely signifying sentence parts (LA NS 
281, PW 261).  
 
 
(8) If something a man is, is it mortal.  
 
(9) If Napoleon a man is, is Napoleon mortal. 
 
Stoic logic provides ample evidence for 
language regimentation intended to bridge 
the gap between linguistic expression and 
the structured content expressed. 
 
The regimentation recommends 
formulations in which the antecedent 
sentence and consequent sentence do not 
differ from the sentences that express the 
simple assertibles used as antecedent and 
consequent in the conditional. 
As a bridge from language to thought, a 




The helping language offers formulations in 
which the antecedent sentence and consequent 
sentence do not differ from the sentences that 
express the ‘Teilgedanken’ of the conditional. 
 





(i) It requires the same subject expression in 
the antecedent and consequent sentence. 
(Standard in Stoic logic and argumentation.) 
Nothing further is required, since (14) is 
already in the regimented language. 
 
(i) It requires the use of the same subject 
expression in the antecedent and consequent 
sentences. 
(ii) Additionally, it removes the defect of (9) by 
replacing it with  
 
(10) If Napoleon is a man, Napoleon is mortal. 
    
(The sentence structure of (10) is infelicitous in 
German.) 
 
Comparison with the Stoics here aids us in understanding Frege’s helping language. It is not 
unusual that ‘Hilfssprache’ is translated and interpreted as ‘meta-language’, as opposed to the 
object language—presumably ‘If Napoleon a man is, is he mortal’ (‘Wenn Napoleon ein 
Mensch ist, ist er sterblich’). But there is nothing meta-linguistic in Frege’s ‘Hilfssprache’. It 
is a regimented object language. Its purpose is to bring out the logical structure of the—
incorporeal—thought in the medium of language (this being the only medium we have). It is 





The historical data strongly suggest that Frege knew Prantl’s History of Western Logic. A 
textual comparison that results in well over a hundred parallels (I count 120, and this is 
without the parallels in epistemology and on inference) strongly suggests that Stoic logic had 
an impact on Frege. Common sense suggests that, if this is so, it is more likely that the impact 
of Stoic logic came via Prantl than from the dozens of individual Greek and Latin sources 
that Prantl amasses in his footnotes.137 This is supported by the fact that in at least three or 
four cases (depending on how one individuates them), Frege’s view corresponds to Prantl’s 
representation or interpretation of the Stoics more closely than to the Stoic view itself (or to a 
different, more plausible interpretation). These include: Stoic non-assertible complete 
contents, in particular questions, contain the element of truth and falsehood; the treatment of 
 
137 I, for one, cannot see that Frege read his way through the edition of PHerc307 and the Greek 
volumes of the Aristotle commentators, and Galen (although S.E. is another possibility) to pick up the 
various fragmentary testimonies of Stoic logic sprinkled throughout, which we now have collected in 
SVF II and, in particular, in FDS. 




more-than-assertibles and quasi-assertibles as two different kinds; complete contents that 
include emotional elements contain truth and falsehood; the presentation of the truth-
conditions of the Philonian conditionals. Moreover, this view is supported by the fact that 
several important testimonies of Stoic logic that are not in Prantl have no parallels in Frege: 
e.g. elements from the Logical Investigations, about Stoic analysis, and about hypothetical 
arguments. If Stoic logic had an impact on Frege, Prantl is thus the likeliest source. 
Where does this leave us with respect to plagiarism, which I so bumptiously included 
in the title of this essay? Did Frege take the work or ideas of the Stoics and pass them off as 
his own?138 None of the similarities presented taken by itself is proof that he did. The sheer 
magnitude of the similarities makes it extremely unlikely that he did not.  
What would be our alternatives? I see two. First, Frege could have come up with all 
these points himself, without any external influence. Second, Frege could have drawn on non-
Stoic sources. Evidently, given the quantity of parallels proffered, the three options allow for 
all sorts of combination. There will be no way to prove for any specific point that Frege came 
up with it by himself, independently of Prantl’s Stoics. (We would need proof that he could 
not have had access to Prantl, and, given our historical data, that would be extremely hard to 
come by.) In principle, there will be ways of showing that Frege drew on more recent non-
Stoic sources. For some of the parallels I adduce there are similarities and overlap in 
nineteenth-century logic books with which Frege was familiar. One recurrent significant 
feature is that other sources may touch on the same topic but only Frege and the Stoics end up 
adopting effectively the same view on the topic, or views very close to each other. Other 
logicians talk at length about negation. But they do not use ‘not’ (‘nicht’) as an informal 
prefix in the schematic expression of negations. Other logicians may talk about sentences 
with ‘no’ (‘kein’) and ‘un’, but they do not do so in the same sentence, in the same order, and 
directly after defining negations proper. Other logicians talk about generality, but do they 
introduce examples of instances in which the subject term is the same in antecedent and 
consequent? And so forth. This is the pattern I found in many of the cases of Frege’s 
contemporaries that I have examined: overlap in topic, yes, but only rarely in the position 
taken. A text that combines both the topic that Frege considers and the position he adopts, 
compared to one that does not take, and possibly explicitly dismisses, Frege’s position, seems 
more likely to have been an influence. For a good number of the parallels there seems to be 
no source other than Stoic logic available at the time when Frege writes. 
 
138 Cf. the epigram of this paper.  




Even if it were possible to show that sixty percent of the parallels I have adduced have 
equally close parallels in other works on logic that Frege knew (something I doubt can be 
shown), this would leave sufficient parallels for a claim of plagiarism of sorts (see below). 
Moreover, there is a further probabilistic factor. Prantl’s chapter on the Stoics offers in one 
chapter of one book a possible source for a hundred or so parallels. We can assume that with 
such a number of parallels the likelihood is greater that the instances in Frege, or in any case 
many of them, come from one source rather than a broad scattering of sources. 
 We know that Frege read many works in which were discussed psychological, 
epistemological, and mathematical themes which he takes up in his own philosophical 
writings. There is an ample literature devoted to establishing individual examples of such 
connections, albeit not always successfully in my view (e.g. in the cases of Eucken and 
Hirzel). My focus in section III has been exclusively on topics that fall within the category of 
philosophical logic, broadly understood. Nineteenth century discussions of these topics are 
rare. The best sources are logic texts of the time: Sigwart 1873, Mill 1843, Ulrici 1852, 
Bolzano 1837, Boole 1854. De Morgan 1847, Ueberweg 1857, and Trendelenburg 1840, 
1870.3 So unless and until someone provides a study which sets out the required evidence, we 
may maintain that the proposed thesis of Stoic influence on Frege via Prantl stands.  
We still need an answer to the question of how Prantl’s Stoic logic became 
incorporated into Frege’s work. Was it intentional? Was it really plagiarism? To start with, 
we can with certainty rule out one kind of plagiarism: that of the ignorant student or career-
obsessed academic who lifts entire sentences or passages without understanding what they 
copy. Even though we often witness Frege battling with details of his theory, he only writes 
what he has thought through, understands, and approves of. We can also rule out a related 
kind of plagiarism, in which someone does understand what they take from their source, but 
nonetheless copies mechanically and verbatim. Whatever Frege took (assuming he did) is 
reproduced neither mindlessly nor mechanically. This leaves us with several somewhat more 
benign options.  
 
(i) He incorporated elements of what he had read and studied from Prantl (and 
possibly from the Summary) when writing his own work. However, he did not do so 
deliberately but, rather, considered what he wrote as his own ideas. This is a familiar 
psychological phenomenon. In this case we would have a process of the –illegitimate– 
appropriation or assimilation of Stoic thought rather than intentional plagiarism. 
 




(ii) He thought of the ideas of the ancients as being freely available to anyone to help 
themselves to and not subject to any copyright, and for this reason did not refer to the 
source on which he relied. We know that Frege was influenced by later philosophers 
in some of his thought and frequently felt no need to reference them (e.g. Dummett 
1981b, Lotze; Schlotter 2006, Bruno Bauch; Dathe 1995, Eucken).  
 
(iii) He incorporated elements of what he had read and studied from Prantl when 
writing his own work, and he knowingly omitted any mention of this fact for reasons 
other than those in (ii).  
 
The reality could be any combination of (i), (ii), and (iii), and details could be spun out in 
many ways. It is neither in my interest to adjudicate between the three options or to spin out 
possible details. Nor—as I said at the beginning—Polish is my interest in questions of 
accountability or culpability. If Dummett is correct that Frege’s ‘Kernsätze’ ‘form a series of 
comments by Frege upon Lotze’s Introduction [to his Logik], or, more exactly, of remarks 
prompted by reflection upon it’,139 we have here one illustration of how Frege makes notes 
and interacts with the texts of other philosophers, when forming or rethinking his own ideas. 
This is consistent with all combinations of (i)–(iii). (Of course the Kernsätze were just an 
unpublished fragment.) The purpose of this paper has been accomplished if it establishes that 
there are similarities to such a colossal extent, in terminological distinctions, choice of topics, 
and content, that the probability that Frege did not substantially draw on Stoic logic is 
minute.  
 Yet what if, against all odds, Frege did, in fact, not draw on Stoic logic? Then we 
have the following immensely fascinating situation. Separated by over two millennia, we 
witness logicians who started (a) with the same general idea of content that—in some sense at 
least—exists independently of our saying or thinking it, and (b) with the same general 
conception of a propositional logic. These logicians were then confronted by the same set of 
problems: problems regarding how linguistic expressions can serve us to express and 
communicate that imperceptible content and can explain the complexity of content 
(especially as it is required for reasoning); how for this purpose natural language expressions 
may fall short in several ways: in particular how they may contain too much or too little or 
the wrong expressions, and how they may not provide the means to unambiguously express 
 
139 Dummett 1981b: 440, 1991: 66. 




content of potentially unlimited complexity. In this case, independently of each other, both the 
Stoics and Frege would have thoroughly considered all four issues, and in doing so would 
have followed staggeringly similar pathways.140  
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